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Foreword 
 
The Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs has established interdisciplinary research on 
policy problems as the core of its educational program. A major element of this program is the 
nine-month policy research project, in the course of which one or more faculty members direct the 
research of ten to twenty graduate students of diverse disciplines and academic backgrounds on a 
policy issue of concern to a government or nonprofit agency. This “client orientation” brings the 
students face to face with administrators, legislators, and other officials active in the policy process 
and demonstrates that research in a policy environment demands special knowledge and skill sets. 
It exposes students to challenges they will face in relating academic research, and complex data, 
to those responsible for the development and implementation of policy and how to overcome those 
challenges  
 
The curriculum of the LBJ School is intended not only to develop effective public servants, but 
also to produce research that will enlighten and inform those already engaged in the policy process. 
The project that resulted in this report has helped to accomplish the first task; it is our hope that 
the report itself will contribute to the second.  
 
Finally, it should be noted that neither the LBJ School nor The University of Texas at Austin  
necessarily endorses the views or findings of this report.  
 
Angela Evans  
Dean 
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Executive Summary 
 
Over the last two decades, Mexico has enacted multiple domestic programs and international 
initiatives to manage the movement of migrants and illicit goods across its southern border states. 
In July 2014, Mexico launched its most recent major initiative, the Southern Border Program 
(Programa Frontera Sur), amid the arrival of an unprecedented number of Central American 
minors traveling through Mexico to the U.S.-Mexico border. This report provides an analysis of 
Mexico’s Southern Border Program, setting it within a historical context, describing the program 
and its consequences, and examining its legacy. 
 
The Southern Border Program had two stated objectives: 1) protect migrants who entered Mexico, 
and 2) manage migration with the aim of promoting security and prosperity in the country’s 
southern border states. In practice, the government focused its resources on achieving the second 
goal, boosting the numbers of apprehensions and deportations throughout the region. The Southern 
Border Program also affected Central Americans’ security in their journey to the United States. As 
Mexico increased its enforcement operations, the number and rate of crimes against migrants rose. 
Migrants also changed how they traveled through Mexico, shifting to more remote routes, relying 
more heavily on paid guides to help them on their journey, and abandoning traditional forms of 
transportation, such as the train known as La Bestia.  
 
Previous studies have formed conclusions about the Southern Border Program from anecdotes and 
raw numbers. This report sought to determine if the sharp rise in operations, apprehensions, 
personnel, and crimes against migrants during the program’s peak was entirely the result of the 
program’s policies, or if these numbers had also increased proportionally to the growing number 
of Central Americans migrating through Mexico. To examine this question, the authors developed 
a model to estimate the number of Central American migrants leaving their home countries for 
Mexico and the United States. Ultimately, the model found that enforcement levels and other 
developments appear to be due to factors beyond evolving migration patterns.    
 
Though Mexican government documents indicate that the Southern Border Program still exists, 
many of its most prominent features generally lasted only a year or two at most. Since 2015, 
operations and apprehensions have declined to approximately pre-Southern Border Program 
levels. Crimes against migrants have also dropped, suggesting an inverse relationship between 
enforcement operations and migrant safety. Meanwhile, other effects of the program have endured. 
Migrants continue to use guides at higher rates and avoid traveling by train.  
 
This report concludes with policy recommendations that seek to regularize migration in Mexico, 
clarify the legality of joint operations, improve the program’s public transparency, and strengthen 
the humanitarian goals originally laid out by the Southern Border Program. 
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Chapter 1: History of Mexico’s Southern Border and 
Migration Flows 
 
This chapter provides an overview of Mexico’s immigration policies and a short history of Central 
American transit migration through the country. It begins in the nineteenth century and continues 
through the years immediately preceding the Southern Border Program.1 
 
Formation of Mexico’s Southern Border and Early Immigration Policies  
 
For more than a century, Mexico and Guatemala have maintained a peaceful and open border. 
Following their 1821 independence from Spain, the two countries engaged in 80 years of territorial 
disputes. This ended in 1902, when they finalized their national boundaries. However, even with 
national lines drawn, Mexico’s southern region remained culturally and economically fluid, as 
goods and people passed easily between countries. Indigenous communities retained strong 
kinship ties on both sides of the border, and workers also crossed seamlessly, with the Mexican 
coffee industry relying on Guatemalan seasonal workers.i  
 
Throughout the nineteenth and well into the twentieth century, migration to Mexico remained 
relatively low.ii Since its independence, Mexico had encouraged European immigration as a means 
to modernize, grow, and “whiten” its population.iii Between 1895 and 1910, 140,000 Europeans 
and North Americans arrived in Mexico, where they held privileged social and economic positions 
as landowners and merchants.iv By comparison, during this time period, approximately 41,000 
Guatemalans migrated to Mexico as refugees fleeing regional violence.2v 
 
This era of open border policies ended with the Mexican Revolution of 1910-1920. Intent on 
protecting native Mexicans from foreign exploitation, Mexico’s Constitution of 1917 segregated 
native-born citizens from both noncitizens and naturalized citizens and stripped foreigners of their 
rights.vi The Constitution prohibited immigrants from participating in Mexico’s public security 
forces, public service offices, and public political discourse. It also promoted workplace 
discrimination against foreigners, allowed private citizens to arrest unauthorized immigrants, and 
held that foreigners could be expelled from Mexico without due process.vii  
 
 
 
 
                                               
1 When this report uses the term “Central Americans,” it is referring to citizens of Honduras, El Salvador, and 
Guatemala—the three largest sending countries for migrants to Mexico and the United States. 
2 Many European and North American arrivals ultimately stayed only briefly in Mexico, making no attempt to 
assimilate with the Mexican population. Nearly 20,000 Chinese and Japanese citizens also arrived during this 
period. 
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Criminalization of Immigration and Central American Displacement  
 
A domestic population boom, an influx of highly skilled immigrants, unemployment, and 
increased Mexican emigration to the United States, prompted Mexico’s 1974 General Law of 
Population, which addressed migration to, from, and through Mexico.viii The law concluded a long 
period of increasingly restrictive immigration reforms that initially targeted Asian and poor 
immigrants, and extended the restrictions to include almost all immigrants.ix The General Law of 
Population drastically limited immigration within Mexico and imposed criminal penalties on 
unauthorized immigrants. Foreigners caught entering the country without permission faced up to 
two years imprisonment, and those caught reentering the country after a previous deportation faced 
up to ten years.x Mexican authorities at the state, local, and federal levels were also required to ask 
foreigners for proof of their lawful immigration status. Although rarely enforced, these provisions 
allowed corrupt Mexican officials to extort migrants through threats of extended jail time.xi  
 
Despite these restrictions, the first major Central American migration wave through Mexico’s 
southern border occurred in the 1980s, with Salvadoran and Guatemalan refugees fleeing state-
sponsored killings and other human rights atrocities committed in their home countries.xii Fleeing 
a genocide that ultimately killed over 200,000, indigenous Mayan Guatemalans were the first to 
arrive in Mexico. Between 1981 and 1984, more than 200,000 Guatemalans entered southern 
Mexico, many settling in local communities or refugee camps managed by the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).xiii Though Mexico largely tolerated the refugees’ 
presence, it did not offer them legal status and occasionally enacted mass deportations.xiv  
 
Individuals from El Salvador also began arriving in southern Mexico, fleeing a 12-year civil war 
between Marxist guerillas and a right-wing government that ultimately claimed 75,000 lives. The 
United States played an active role in the conflict, providing financial support and military training 
for the Salvadoran government, whose armed forces were responsible for 85 percent of the killings, 
kidnappings, and torture that occurred during the war.xv The majority of Salvadorans who fled did 
not stay in Mexico, but continued on to the United States and Canada, contributing to the trend of 
increased transit migration through Mexico. Between 1981 and 1990, hundreds of thousands of 
Salvadorans entered the United States without authorization.xvi  
 
Militarization of Mexico’s Southern Border States and Central America Migration  
 
During the 1990s, Mexico continued to take steps to control migration in its southern states. In 
1993, Mexico established the National Institute of Migration (Instituto Nacional de Migración, 
INM).xvii INM was located within Mexico’s Ministry of the Interior (Secretaría de Gobernación, 
SEGOB), and was the responsible agency for enforcing new migration restrictions and regulating 
“the entry, stay, voluntary exit, and forced expulsion of foreigners in Mexico.”xviii  
 
  
 
3 
In 1994, Mexico’s southern states gained the attention of national security forces when indigenous 
communities formed the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (Ejército Zapatista de Liberación 
Nacional) to protest the socioeconomic oppression of Mexico’s indigenous peoples.xix Rafael 
Sebastián Guillén Vicente, also known as Subcomandante Marcos, led the Zapatistas’ rebellion 
against the Mexican government and took control of several Chiapas villages by force.xx Though 
the conflict itself lasted roughly two weeks, Mexico responded to the confrontation by increasing 
the military’s presence in the southern border region. By 1999, Mexico had stationed 
approximately 60,000 soldiers in Chiapas—an estimated one soldier for every three or four 
residents in some areas.xxi The military also constructed new barracks and roads to facilitate troop 
movement into remote communities.xxii Militarization dovetailed with the creation of the region’s 
first border security program, Operation Seal the Border (Operación Sellamiento), which aimed to 
combat drug trafficking in Mexico’s northern and southern border regions.  
 
Even as Mexico’s military presence increased in the southern states, migrants continued to transit 
through the region. The civil wars in El Salvador and Guatemala ended in 1992 and 1996, 
respectively, but the end of political violence did not stop Central American migration to the 
United States. Beginning in the 1990s and throughout the early 2000s, high poverty levels and a 
series of hurricanes and earthquakes led to a continuous uptick in migration among Guatemalans, 
Salvadorans, and, later, Hondurans.  
 
It wasn’t until 1999 when Honduran migration began in earnest. These numbers picked up after 
Hurricane Mitch, which made landfall in October 1998 and left 1.4 million people homeless.xxiii 
The United States was quick to provide relief funding following the hurricane, and Temporary 
Protected Status (TPS) for Hondurans already in the country.3xxiv However, it also took steps to 
prevent the arrival of displaced Hondurans at its border. Both Mexico and Guatemala assisted with 
these efforts, intercepting and deporting tens of thousands of Honduran migrants before they could 
reach the United States.xxv  
 
Mexico: Decriminalization of Migration (2000s) 
 
By 2000, Mexico’s relationship to migration largely centered on its own status as a major 
immigrant sending country to the United States. During that year, the number of Mexican-born 
immigrants in the United States had reached 9.2 million.xxvi Former Mexican President Vicente 
Fox (2000-2006) sought to regularize Mexican migration to the United States and began working 
with former President George W. Bush on a comprehensive immigration plan.  
 
                                               
3 Temporary Protected Status (TPS) is a form of temporary legal status for immigrants in the United States who 
cannot return to their home countries due to war or natural disasters. Issued by U.S. presidents, TPS must be 
renewed every two years, and can be revoked once a president deems it safe for immigrants to return to their 
countries. 
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In an alleged effort to show the United States that Mexico was a partner in migration issues, 
Mexico took steps in the summer of 2001 to stem Central American transit migration through the 
Southern Plan (Plan Sur). Several months later, on September 7, 2001, the United States and 
Mexico announced an agreement that signaled their first steps toward immigration policy reforms. 
Yet four days later, the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks ended these negotiations, beginning 
an era of heightened U.S. focus on border security and an increased crackdown on unauthorized 
migration.  
 
In the early 2000s, Central Americans continued to travel through Mexico. In 2005, the number of 
Central American apprehensions along both the U.S.-Mexico border and the Mexico-Guatemala 
border spiked. These migrants were largely coming to improve their economic status and reunify 
with family members already in the United States. Soon after, in 2007, the number of 
apprehensions dropped steeply, a decline that is often attributed to the United States’ economic 
recession.xxvii 
 
As the Mexican government continued to promote the rights of its undocumented citizens in the 
United States, it elicited criticism for its own highly restrictive immigration laws. In response to 
these critiques, Mexico passed a series of immigration reforms.xxviii In 2008, amendments to its 
1974 General Law of Population decriminalized migration. The legislation reduced unauthorized 
entry from a felony charge, punishable by two years in prison, to an administrative infraction, 
carrying a fine of MX$5000 (approximately US$260).xxix The Mexican government also created a 
new visa program that allowed laborers from Belize and Guatemala to live in the southern border 
states for one year. Another visa allowed them to spend three days in Mexico for business or 
travel.xxx  
 
In 2011, Mexico passed legislation that addressed its role as a transit country for migrants. 
Following the 2010 massacre of 72 mostly Central American migrants in northeastern Mexico, the 
2011 Migratory Law acknowledged the government’s responsibility to protect migrants’ rights. It 
outlined that undocumented foreigners would receive equal treatment under Mexican law, 
including the right to due process, education, and healthcare in Mexico.xxxi The law took effect just 
as Central American migration began to outpace Mexican migration to the United States.  
 
Central America: Gang Violence and Changing Migrant Demographics  
 
By 2011, the number of Central American apprehensions began to increase at the U.S. border. 
These latest migrants were almost exclusively from Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras, but 
their demographics had shifted. Between 2011 and 2012, a growing number of Central American 
women, families, and children began traveling through Mexico to reach the United States. In 2014, 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection apprehended roughly 61,300 families at the U.S.-Mexico 
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border, an eightfold increase from the previous year. The number of unaccompanied minors more 
than doubled, from 20,800 in 2013 to 51,700 in 2014.xxxii 
 
Figure 1 
CBP Apprehensions at the U.S. Southwest Border by Nationality (FY2007-2018) 
 
Source: U.S. Customs and Border Protection 
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Figure 2 
CBP Apprehensions of Central Americans at U.S. Southwest Border by Demographic  
(FY2012-2018) 
 
Source: U.S. Customs and Border Protection 
 
The motivations for these new migratory trends are complex and often overlapping. Widespread 
gang violence and domestic abuse have sent some migrants fleeing for their lives. Others seek 
economic opportunities, as the Northern Triangle region continues to experience some of the 
highest poverty levels in the world. Commodity prices have also pushed Central Americans into 
poverty, as a crisis in the Guatemalan and Honduran coffee industries—exacerbated by climate 
change—has caused many Guatemalans and Hondurans to emigrate in search of stable jobs.xxxiii 
Still others transit through Mexico to reunite with family members in the United States, many of 
whom first entered the country following the political violence and natural disasters of the 1980s 
and 1990s. Overall, most often, Central Americans leave their countries for a combination of these 
reasons.  
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Chapter 2: Historical Overview of Mexico’s Southern Border 
Security Policies 
 
Mexico has a long history of implementing security programs along its southern border. As early 
as 1998, Mexico enacted programs to control migration, drugs, arms, and human trafficking in the 
region.4 
 
Operation Seal the Border (Operación Sellamiento) 
 
● Years: Operation Seal the Border began in February 1998xxxiv 
● Leadership: Mexican President Ernesto Zedillo, Institutional Revolutionary Party (Partido 
Revolucionario Institucional, PRI) 
● Objectives: Operation Seal the Border aimed to combat drug trafficking in the Yucatán 
Peninsula, along the country’s southern and northern borders, throughout the Baja 
California peninsula, and along the Pacific coast and Gulf of Mexico.xxxv  
● Context: Operation Seal the Border reportedly emerged from the 1996 Sustainable Border 
Development Program (Programa de Desarrollo Sustentable de la Frontera, 
PRODESFRO), which was a migration-focused program that aimed to better control and 
document migration flows, improve Mexico-Guatemala cooperation, assist migrant 
workers, and promote development in border communities. In reality, however, little was 
achieved through PRODESFRO, according to the Guatemala-Mexico Migration and 
Development Group (Grupo Guatemala-México, Migración y Desarrollo).xxxvi Unlike 
PRODESFRO, however, Operation Seal the Border was more security focused in nature, 
relying on Mexico’s security forces to combat drug trafficking.xxxvii 
● Responsible Organizations: Mexican Armed Forces (22,000 troops), Federal Police 
(Policía Federal Preventiva, PFP), and the Attorney General’s Office (Procuraduría 
General de la República, PGR).xxxviii These organizations comprised the 11 Regional 
Coordination Groups (Grupos de Coordinación Regional) and 31 Local Coordination 
Groups (Grupos de Coordinación Local), which were inter-agency groups responsible for 
interception activities under Operation Seal the Border.xxxix 
● Funding: Mexican government.xl 
● U.S. Assistance: The United States provided assistance in terms of information sharing.xli 
For instance, Mexico implemented the Hemispheric Information System (Sistema 
Hemisférico de Información), which was a satellite surveillance system along Mexico’s 
southern border. The Hemispheric Information System was used for information sharing 
between Mexico and the United States on drug trafficking.xlii  
                                               
4 See Appendix 1 for information on proposals for security programs along the southern border that were never 
implemented. 
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● Implementation: In addition to the Hemispheric Information System, the Mexican 
government deployed five X-Ray mobile search systems in southern Mexico to detect drug 
smuggling in Chiapas, Tabasco, and the Yucatán peninsula. Thirty-six special forces 
groups with 108 reconnaissance vehicles and 144 intercepting vehicles were also deployed 
in unspecified locations with the same overarching objective as the program.xliii 
● Analysis: President Zedillo’s 2000 State of the Union report said that the operations 
resulted in major narcotics seizures and negatively affected specific trafficking routes.xliv 
While the program’s focus was on countering drug trafficking, an Attorney General’s 
Office official claimed in 2001 that it also allowed the authorities to combat “other crimes” 
carried out across the southern border.xlv These were likely operations against human 
trafficking.xlvi 
● End Date: After 2001, there is no official documentation of Operation Seal the Border. In 
November 2001, however, an Attorney General’s Office official said that it was 
strengthening the program by increasing operation bases for combating drug trafficking 
and illegal immigration. In addition, the head of the Office of the Special Prosecutor for 
Crimes against Health (Fiscalía Especializada en Atención de Delitos Contra la Salud, 
FEADS) stated that the Attorney General’s Office, Army, and Navy would strengthen their 
efforts along the southern border and that Operation Seal the Border would be proposed 
again to also include the Public Security and Communication and Transportation 
Ministries. There is no indication that this happened.xlvii  
 
The Southern Plan (Plan Sur) 
 
● Years: The Southern Plan entered into force in June 2001 and was implemented in July 
2001xlviii 
● Leadership: President Vicente Fox, National Action Party (Partido Acción Nacional, 
PAN) 
● Objectives/Context: The Southern Plan aimed to stem Central American migration by 
improving inspection and immigration checkpoints at the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, along 
the Gulf of Mexico, and on the Pacific coast.xlix In addition, the plan focused on developing 
interagency cooperation across INM, the Federal Police, the Attorney General’s Office, 
and other government agencies to combat organized crime, corruption, and illicit 
trafficking of migrants, narcotics, and other goods.l 
 
The Safe and Orderly Repatriation Plan (Plan de Repatriación Segura y Ordenada) was 
the pilot program for the Southern Border Plan. The Safe and Orderly Repatriation Plan 
lasted only fifteen days: June 5 to June 20, 2001.li Under the Safe and Orderly Repatriation 
Plan, INM officials took apprehended Guatemalan, Honduran, and Salvadoran migrants to 
its control center in Tapachula. The Central American migrants were often taken to 
Guatemala through the El Carmen border crossing and Tecún Umán.lii They were then 
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transported by bus through Guatemala to the border with their home country.liii The 
campaign was coordinated with Guatemala’s We Will Overcome (Venceremos) 2001 
program.liv As part of the joint agreement, Guatemalan authorities would return its own 
nationals to their hometowns. INM held migrants from non-Northern Triangle countries at 
a detention center located in Iztapalapa in Mexico State before sending them back to their 
countries via airplane or boat.lv    
● Responsible Organizations: INM was the primary organization responsible for the 
Southern Plan, although the Federal Police, Army, and Navy also contributed.lvi 
● Funding: US$11 million from the Mexican Government, which included US$9.9 million 
for deportations.lvii  
● U.S. Assistance: The United States provided US$11 million to improve checkpoints and 
to provide Grupo Beta with additional personnel and equipment. Housed under INM, 
Grupo Beta’s stated purpose is to provide migrants with humanitarian aid without engaging 
in enforcement activities. Some allege that the campaign was used as a bargaining chip 
with the United States to promote better treatment for Mexican migrants in the United 
States in exchange for stemming the flow of Central American migrants into the United 
States.lviii  
● Implementation: Between June and September 2001, the Mexican government deployed 
thousands of soldiers and police officers to the southern border region, increased maritime 
patrolling, and added migration control centers along the border with Guatemala and 
Belize.lix Mexico established two security belts—the first belt from Chiapas to Tabasco, 
containing five checkpoints, and the second from Oaxaca to Veracruz, containing six 
checkpoints. All of the checkpoints were strategically situated at main transit points on 
roads and train tracks and operated by the INM, the Federal Police, and the Army.lx 
Maritime operations were also conducted as part of Southern Plan.lxi  
 
The Mexican government conducted large-scale, yet discrete, operations along the 
southern border and in the bottlenecked Isthmus of Tehuantepec, resulting in 6,000 
deportations to Guatemala. Some 3,000 of these individuals were then returned to 
Nicaragua, El Salvador, and elsewhere in the region as part of Guatemala’s 2001 We Will 
Overcome program.  
● Analysis: The Southern Plan was viewed as one of the largest operations against irregular 
migration in Mexico.lxii It came at a time of heightened anti-migrant rhetoric in Mexico 
that often associated migrants with illicit activities such as trafficking, organized crime, 
and terrorism.lxiii Yet, the anti-migrant narrative and the crackdown from authorities put 
migrants more at risk of being victims to the crimes that they were accused of 
committing.lxiv Migration from Central America declined during Southern Plan, although 
the exact causal factors are unclear—given security measures, economic changes, 
increased U.S. border security, more expensive smugglers, and heightened anti-immigrant 
rhetoric in the United States following the September 11th attacks.lxv 
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● End Date: The Southern Plan concluded in 2003.lxvi 
 
High-Level Group of Border Security (Grupo de Alto Nivel de Seguridad Fronteriza)  
High-Level Group on Security (Grupo de Alto Nivel en Seguridad) 
 
● Year: October 2002lxvii 
● Leadership: President Vicente Fox, PAN 
● Objectives/Context: In an effort to improve bilateral cooperation on border security and 
intelligence sharing, Mexico and Guatemala created the High-Level Group of Border 
Security (Grupo de Alto Nivel de Seguridad Fronteriza, GANSEF).lxviii  
● Responsible Organizations: GANSEF was coordinated by the Guatemalan Ministry of 
Governance and Office of Strategic Analysis and Mexico’s SEGOB and Center of 
Investigation and National Security (Centro de Investigación y Seguridad Nacional, 
CISEN).lxix 
● Funding: Mexico and Guatemalalxx 
● Execution/Implementation: During its first binational meeting, GANSEF created 
specialized groups for migration, human rights and border issues; public security; 
international terrorism; organized crime and judicial cooperation; and border customs.lxxi  
● Analysis: In 2008, the group changed its name to High-Level Group on Security (Grupo 
de Alto Nivel en Seguridad, GANSEG).lxxii It appears that the group has met over 15 times. 
However, beyond re-stating their original objectives in these meetings, it is unclear based 
on publicly available information what specific progress the group has achieved on 
improving bilateral cooperation since its establishment.lxxiii  
● End Date: GANSEG is still active.lxxiv 
 
Three Layer System (2014 - Prior to the Southern Border Program) 
 
● Year: March 2014lxxv 
● Leadership: President Enrique Peña Nieto, PRI 
● Objectives/Context: The Mexican government intended to improve security throughout the 
southern border region by implementing three “land and sea containment belts."lxxvi The 
United States had been involved in talks regarding the system’s creation as early as August 
2013.lxxvii  
● Responsible Organizations: The checkpoints were enforced by Mexico’s Federal Police, 
Army, and INM.lxxviii 
● U.S. Assistance: The three layer system was ultimately incorporated as part of the Southern 
Border Program, which received support through the United States Department of State’s 
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) office.lxxix 
● Implementation: The three belts were fixed along geographical lines, located at strategic 
points in Mexico’s southern border region. The first belt is located roughly 30 miles from 
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the southern border, the second is at 100 miles, and the third line runs through the Isthmus 
of Tehuantepec.lxxx The three-layer system makes use of sensors and other technology to 
gather intelligence against criminal groups in the region.lxxxi 
● Analysis: In the summer of 2014, the three layer system was incorporated as part of the 
Southern Border Program.lxxxii However, the Mexican government had already been 
considering establishing the security measures in the region prior to the Southern Border 
Program’s announcement.  
● End Date: The three layer system became part of the Southern Border Program, which 
does not have a clear end date.lxxxiii  
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Chapter 3: Southern Border Program Structure 
 
During the months before Mexico announced its Southern Border Program, tens of thousands of 
unaccompanied minors arrived at the U.S.-Mexico border. The United States developed a 
comprehensive response to the situation, which included collaboration with Mexico on decreasing 
Central American migration. On June 2, 2014, then-U.S. President Barack Obama declared the 
numbers of minors seeking entry into United States an “urgent humanitarian situation.”lxxxiv Two 
weeks later, he spoke on the phone with former Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto to discuss 
the two countries’ “shared responsibility to promote security in both our countries and the 
region.”lxxxv Soon after, former U.S. Vice President Joe Biden met with leaders of Guatemala, 
Honduras, El Salvador, and Mexico to “agree on concrete ways…to stem the flow of migrants 
taking the dangerous trip to the United States.”lxxxvi  
 
On July 7, 2014, President Peña Nieto announced the Southern Border Program. With the Southern 
Border Program, Mexico promised to take on “greater global responsibility” for migration.lxxxvii 
Peña Nieto stated that the Southern Border Program would have two overarching goals: 1) to 
provide greater protections for migrants entering and transiting through Mexico, and 2) to secure 
Mexico’s border with Belize and Guatemala to enhance regional safety and economic 
development.lxxxviii Absent from Peña Nieto’s announcement was what many observers considered 
an implicit goal of the program: preventing Central American migrants—particularly 
unaccompanied minors—from reaching the United States. Yet while the increase in the number of 
unaccompanied minors arriving at the U.S.-Mexico border may have accelerated the Southern 
Border Program’s implementation, many of the announced policies were already in place or being 
developed.lxxxix  
  
To achieve its stated goals, the program contained five points of action:xc 
  
1. Regularize Migration. Peña Nieto’s first point of action aimed to create more formal, 
orderly border crossings by expanding and improving the issuance of temporary entry permits. 
During his announcement, Peña Nieto noted that many Guatemalans and Belizeans visited 
southern Mexico temporarily to work or see family. To regularize migration, the Southern 
Border Program promised to simplify application procedures for regional work and visitor 
permits and establish new application centers for faster processing.5 Under Mexican law, 
Regional Visitor Cards (Tarjeta de Visitante Regional de México) are valid for up to five years 
and allow an unlimited number of stays that last no more than 72 hours. The Border Worker 
Visitor Card (Tarjeta de Visitante Trabajador Fronterizo) permits workers to stay in border 
                                               
5 The Regional Visitor Cards and Border Worker Visitor Cards were first established during the Felipe Calderón 
administration. 
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states for longer periods of time but requires a written job offer from an employer.6xci 
Although the permits were available only to citizens of Guatemala and Belize, at the time 
Peña Nieto said that he was discussing the possibility of extending them to citizens of El 
Salvador and Honduras.  
 
2. Improve Border Security Infrastructure. The Southern Border Program promised to 
enhance migration control infrastructure along its border and within the southern border 
states. While there are 10 official border crossings along Mexico’s southern border, there are 
approximately 720 informal crossings that account for 95 percent of the movement of 
migrants into Mexico.xcii The program aimed to improve the southern border’s ports of entry, 
mobile checkpoints, and biometric screenings of migrants, creating a technological platform 
that would allow Mexico to share migrants’ digital fingerprints, photographs, and other 
identifying information with Guatemala.xciii According to Peña Nieto, it would provide new 
technology and equipment to immigration agents in the border region, reinforce the Southern 
Border Program’s mobile lines of control, and create additional mobile checkpoints to 
regulate irregular migration.  
  
Large customs facilities known as Comprehensive Border Crossing Attention Centers 
(Centros de Atención Integral al Tránsito Fronterizo, CAITFS), were also an important part 
of the Southern Border Program’s second point of action. These facilities house officials from 
INM, the Army, the Navy, the Attorney General’s Office, and the Federal Police, among 
others and serve as interagency cooperation centers for screening northbound traffic and 
promoting southern border security.7 
 
3. Protection of Migrants. For his third point of action, Peña Nieto focused on improving 
migrants’ access to medical care and conditions at migrant shelters. He stated that the 
Southern Border Program would expand migrant medical centers throughout the border states, 
building off the model of five government-sponsored medical centers in Chiapas. He also 
noted that the CAITFS would include medical units.xciv To improve these conditions, Peña 
Nieto pledged to work more closely with civil society organizations.  
  
4. Improve Regional Coordination. The Southern Border Program’s fourth point of action 
aimed to enhance cooperation among El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, and the 
United States to regulate migrant movements. In his speech, Peña Nieto emphasized that the 
                                               
6 Between 2014 and 2016, INM issued 112,050 Regional Visitor Cards and 15,391 Border Worker Visas to citizens 
of Guatemala and Belize. 
7 In his speech, Peña Nieto stated that two of these facilities were already in operation and two were under 
construction. In 2013, the Huixtla CAITF was partially operating, and CAIMFS reports that the facility became fully 
operational in 2015 (an INM transparency request indicates that it became operational in 2014). Two other CAITFS 
opened in 2015 and construction has not begun or remains limited for the remaining two facilities. The Enforcement 
Infrastructure section in Chapter 4 provides additional information. 
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Southern Border Program would include economic development initiatives in Mexico’s 
border states and in the Northern Triangle (Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador). Social 
and economic development efforts would focus on 23 Mexican municipalities near Guatemala 
and one municipality near Belize.xcv According to a 2017 Baker Institute Report, the Southern 
Border Program planned roughly 190 economic projects for states along the southern border, 
and five similar programs in Guatemala.xcvi  
  
5. Improve Interagency Coordination. Finally, Peña Nieto created the Coordinating 
Mechanism for Comprehensive Attention to Migration for the Southern Border 
(Coordinación para la Atención Integral de la Migración en la Frontera Sur, CAIMFS). 
Under the direction of SEGOB, CAIMFS was charged with overseeing the implementation 
of the southern border migration policy, with two specific priorities: 1) to promote social and 
economic development and 2) to address migration in Mexico’s 23 southernmost 
municipalities.xcvii  
 
Coordinating Mechanism for Comprehensive Attention to Migration for the 
Southern Border (CAIMFS)  
 
CAIMFS was formed as an independent coordinating body within SEGOB, with the objective of 
coordinating the Southern Border Program. The new institution was originally staffed with 73 
personnel, given a MX$102 million (US$6.9 million) budget, and charged with focusing on 
development work in the four states that make up Mexico’s southern border: Campeche, Chiapas, 
Quintana Roo, and Tabasco. 8xcviii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
8 A 2019 SEGOB Transparency Request, 0400400000817, outlines 73 official positions within CAIMFS. However, 
this differs from the 94 CAIMFS employees that is often cited, including in Pskowski’s 2018 report. For detailed 
information on the 73 CAIMFS positions, please see Appendix 3. 
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Figure 3 
CAIMFS Budget in Millions USD (2015-2019) 
 
Source: COMAR transparency request 
 
Overall, CAIMFS primarily focused on development activities, although it also coordinated 
activities at the CAITFs.xcix Between July 2014 and June 2015, CAIMFS conducted 25 meetings 
with INM, the Army, the Navy, the Federal Police, the Attorney General’s Office, the Chiapas 
government, and train operators regarding the regulation and control of migration.c The agency 
also contributed to the creation of Specialized Prosecutor's Offices for the Attention of Crimes 
Against Migrants (Fiscalías Especializadas para Atención de Delitos Contra Migrantes).ci The 
three goals of these specialized offices were to: 1) reduce the number of crimes committed against 
migrants, 2) guarantee access to justice for migrants, and 3) establish coordination with federal 
and international authorities.cii  
 
In 2015, SEGOB produced a report that provided detailed information regarding CAIMFS’s 
activities and its results. This activities report outlined CAIMFS’s achievements and 
responsibilities, claiming that CAIMFS had completed 43 projects aimed at development in the 
southern border municipalities during its first year.9 These activities included infrastructure 
projects, meetings and seminars, and showing other Mexican officials around the border region.ciii 
In August 2015 the Director of CAIMFS, Humberto Mayans, resigned from his position, and  
suggested that the agency would be integrated into other federal bodies. Following 2015, SEGOB 
                                               
9 For example, on November 28, 2016, a CAIMFS-led campaign in the municipality of Benemérito de las Américas, 
Chiapas featured approximately 200 federal officials providing free medical, dental, and gynecological 
consultations. The campaign also rehabilitated public spaces and school campuses.  
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stopped printing CAIMFS-specific reports but has continued to include information on its social 
programs throughout Mexico, including CAIMFS’s activities, in its annual activity reports. 
 
U.S. Support for the Southern Border Program 
 
As with previous Mexican southern border security policies, the United States has provided 
funding to support the Southern Border Program.civ On July 8, 2014—one day after Peña Nieto 
announced the Southern Border Program—the Obama administration requested emergency 
supplemental appropriations from the U.S. Senate Committee on Appropriations. This request 
would allocate U.S. government funding for fiscal year 2014 to help address the arrival of 
unaccompanied minors along the U.S.-Mexico border.cv Two days later, then-Counselor of the 
United States Department of State, Thomas A. Shannon, spoke in front of the U.S. Senate 
Appropriations Committee about the president’s emergency supplemental request.cvi According to 
Shannon, the United States was poised to support the Southern Border Program through US$86 
million dollars in funds channeled through the State Department’s Bureau of International 
Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) office.cvii 
According to the Congressional Research Service, as of 2018, the United States had provided 
Mexico with more than US$100 million in equipment and training to Mexican military forces to 
support its efforts to secure the southern border region.cviii This funding was part of the Mérida 
Initiative, a bilateral partnership that began in 2007 to combat organized crime in the region, and 
was allocated through INL and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics 
and Global Threats in the U.S. State Department.cix The Mérida Initiative does not have any official 
connection with the Southern Border Program, but the United States has used the Mérida Initiative 
as a conduit for helping fund security measures in Mexico’s southern border region.cx 
Beyond these general numbers, it is difficult to detail the United States’ exact funding amounts in 
support of the Southern Border Program. According to an October 2018 Congressional Research 
Service report, the U.S. Department of Defense and the U.S. Department of State have assisted 
Mexico by providing funds, equipment, technology, and training for operations throughout its 
southern border.cxi Figure 4 outlines some of the U.S. Department of Defense and Department of 
State’s assistance to Mexico.  
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Figure 4 
U.S. Agency Support for the Southern Border Program 
U.S. Agency Support 
Department of State 
US$32 million in equipment and training assistance, including: non-intrusive 
inspection equipment, kiosks, canine teams, and training for INM officials 
operating in the south.cxii  
In 2014, the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) noted that at least 
two ports of entry on Mexico’s southern border contained U.S.-donated 
biometric data kiosks.cxiii These kiosks are networked with Mexico City, which 
enable information sharing with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s 
Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT).10  
 
In FY2019, the U.S. Department of State’s Migration and Refugees Assistance 
foreign aid account recommended that the Mexican Commission for Refugee 
Assistance (Comisión Mexicana de Ayuda a Refugiados, COMAR) receive 
US$18 million. These funds are meant to help COMAR increase their 
processing capacity of asylum applications.cxiv 
Department of Defense 
 
The U.S. Department of Defense has provided training and equipment to 
Mexican military forces.cxv According to an October 2014 WOLA report, this 
equipment included patrol boats, night vision tools, maritime sensors, and 
helicopters.cxvi 
Mexico used INL and DOD funding to install cellular communications towers to 
improve communication among migration authorities. As of June 2017, the 
program had constructed 12 towers on naval bases.cxvii 
 
U.S.-funded equipment has mostly gone to INM. However, the United States has also provided 
non-intrusive inspection equipment, helicopters, patrol boats, information technology, and 
biometric kiosks to other government agencies, including Mexico’s General Customs 
Administration (Administración General de Aduanas, AGA), the Navy, the Army, and  the Federal 
Police.cxviii During the first year and a half after the Southern Border Program’s implementation, 
the United States provided Mexico’s Federal Police forces operating in Chiapas with equipment, 
technical assistance, and training in order to combat organized crime and migrant exploitation. 
Chiapas and Tabasco state police officers also received U.S. training.cxix 
 
                                               
10 IDENT aims to improve Mexico’s information on those crossing the border and serve as an early warning system 
for detecting individuals en route to the U.S. with ties to organized crime and terrorist groups. 
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Chapter 4: Southern Border Program Implementation 
 
This chapter discusses the Southern Border Program's enforcement infrastructure, personnel 
deployments, and operations. The following sections focus on Mexico’s immigration enforcement 
efforts in Chiapas, Tabasco, Oaxaca, and Veracruz, which are described in this report as the 
“southern border states.” This geographic region also includes the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, which 
funnels all northbound movement into a smaller area than Mexico’s physical southern border. 
Under the Southern Border Program, Mexico sought to intercept migrants at this narrow point in 
their journey, before they dispersed into central Mexico. 
 
Enforcement Infrastructure 
 
During the Southern Border Program’s implementation, the Mexican government did not create 
new types of migratory enforcement infrastructure, but rather incorporated existing plans into the 
program and expanded them. One of these existing plans was the three-layer security system 
(discussed in the Historical Overview of Mexico’s Southern Border Security Policies section), 
which aimed to detect and stop irregular migrants passing through Mexico’s southern border 
region by taking advantage of the highway system and geographic choke points, particularly the 
Isthmus of Tehuantepec.cxx  
 
CAITFs 
 
A major element of this three-layer system were the large customs facilities known as CAITFs, 
which established the second belt of control. CAITFs were constructed within about 50 miles of 
the border on strategic highway choke points and function as internal ports of entry. Although 
originally intended to be SAT customs checkpoints for inspecting goods coming into Mexico, the 
Southern Border Program transformed CAITFs into interagency cooperation centers.cxxi A range 
of government actors operated at the CAITFs, including the Army, Navy, INM, Federal Police, 
federal Attorney General’s Office, CISEN, AGA, agricultural and health inspectors, and municipal 
and state authorities.cxxii CAIMFS was responsible for coordinating the agencies’ activities at the 
CAITFs.cxxiii 
 
For detecting irregular migration, CAITFs would systematically funnel northbound traffic into the 
facilities, allowing INM to inspect buses or private cars to check documents of suspected 
undocumented individuals. Between 2014 and 2015, a total of 25 INM personnel were responsible 
for conducting migratory inspections at the three sites.11cxxiv The map below shows the locations 
of the three CAITFs—Huixtla, La Trinitaria, and Playas de Catazajá—that became operational in 
                                               
11 CAITF Huixtla had 16 INM agents, CAITF La Trinitaria had 4, and CAITF Playas de Catazajá had 5. 
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2014 and 2015.cxxv Details on two additional planned CAITFs are discussed in the legacy section 
of this report. 
 
Figure 5 
CAITF Facilities and Mexico’s Three-Layer System 
 
Source: CAIMFS, INM, SCT, SEMAR, and SRE transparency requests 
 
Checkpoints 
 
The Southern Border Program relied on layers of permanent and mobile checkpoints within 100 
miles of Mexico’s southern border to provide INM with multiple opportunities to check travelers’ 
immigration status.cxxvi Fixed checkpoints were present in southern Mexico before the Southern 
Border Program’s implementation. However, in late 2014, a permanent checkpoint opened in 
Balacán, Tabasco, according to a Guatemalan consular representative in Tenosique.12  
 
INM officials also increasingly used mobile checkpoints under the Southern Border Program. The 
U.S. Congressional Research Service reported that by 2016, Mexico had deployed more than 100 
mobile highway checkpoints throughout Mexico’s southern border region as part of the 
program.cxxvii These checkpoints, known as volantas, can be as rudimentary as impromptu road 
blocks using INM vehicles. INM moved the mobile checkpoints strategically throughout the 
                                               
12 It is possible that additional permanent checkpoints were constructed under the Southern Border Program, but 
INM transparency requests did not confirm this information. 
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southern border region to add an element of surprise for migrants and smugglers.cxxviii INM 
operated these mobile checkpoints, at times with Federal Police support. Around this time, local 
groups in Chiapas reported more sophisticated equipment at mobile checkpoints and an increase 
in checkpoints on secondary roads.cxxix  
 
Naval Facilities 
 
Similar to the CAITFs, the Navy was planning and constructing facilities before the Southern 
Border Program’s announcement. However, these facilities became incorporated into the program. 
In 2014, there were approximately 12 Advanced Naval Stations (Estaciones Navales Avanzadas) 
under construction, and between September 2014 and July 2015, the Navy completed four of these 
stations.cxxx The Mexican government’s annual report for 2014 and 2015 said that these facilities 
aimed to “increase the effectiveness of measures against criminal groups that attack and injure the 
migrant population and inhabitants in the southeast region.”cxxxi Three of the bases were 
constructed in Chiapas (La Angostura Dam, Frontera Corozal, and La Libertad) and the fourth is 
in Chetumal, Quintana Roo.cxxxii In addition, the Navy completed a large naval post at Port Chiapas 
in Tapachula, Chiapas, as part of its efforts to secure Mexico’s southern border region.cxxxiii  
 
Personnel Deployments 
 
After the Southern Border Program was implemented, the INM and Federal Police increased the 
number of agents and officers in Chiapas, Oaxaca, Tabasco, and Veracruz. This increase was 
meant to address the program’s second stated objective of increasing security in the region. 
Figure 6 highlights the total number of INM agents in these four states from 2011 to 2019.cxxxiv 
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Figure 6 
Total INM Agents in the Southern Border Region (2011-2019) 
 
Source: SEGOB 
 
SEGOB data shows that following the Southern Border Program’s implementation in 2014, there 
was an increase in INM agents in the southern border states. In 2011, there were 549 INM agents 
in the southern states of Chiapas, Oaxaca, Tabasco, and Veracruz out of 2,490 agents across 
Mexico.cxxxvBy 2015, this number had increased to 602 active INM agents in the region. These 
agents made up 26 percent of the 2,300 total INM agents active throughout Mexico that year.  
 
The increase in agents was most evident in Chiapas, where the majority of migrants enter Mexico. 
In 2015 and 2016, there were 284 INM agents stationed in Chiapas, representing the highest 
number of agents in any Mexican state.cxxxviSince 2014, Chiapas has seen an increase every year 
in the number of INM agents operating in its territory. Between 2013 and 2014, there was a 12 
percent increase in the number of INM agents in Chiapas.cxxxvii Figure 7 shows the number of INM 
agents per state in 2015, with the darkest shaded states representing the locations where most INM 
agents operate.cxxxviii 
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Figure 7 
Number of INM Agents per State (2015) 
 
Source: SEGOB 
 
Mexico also deployed the Federal Police to support INM's migration enforcement efforts in the 
southern border states.cxxxixBetween July 2014 and November 2015, the Federal Police deployed 
several hundred Mexican Federal Police agents to Chiapas, particularly to the cities of Tapachula 
and Tuxtla Gutiérrez and on the main highways.cxl Additionally, in September 2014, Mexico’s 
Gendarmerie—a unit of the Federal Police—sent 100 members to Chiapas. However, the 
Gendarmerie’s focus was on addressing violence and crime rather than stopping migration.cxli  
 
INM Operations  
 
Following the Southern Border Program’s announcement, the INM swiftly increased its 
enforcement operations in southern Mexico. From 2014 to 2015, the INM’s expanded use of 
mobile checkpoints and increase in personnel allowed the agency to conduct nearly 11,000 
additional operations. These operations generally targeted migration routes throughout the states 
of Chiapas, Tabasco, Oaxaca, and Veracruz. 
 
INM operations can be divided into two main types of enforcement activities: migratory 
inspections (revisiones migratorias) and verification visits (visitas de verificación).cxliiA migratory 
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inspection involves INM officers reviewing individuals’ immigration statuses at fixed and mobile 
checkpoints, train tracks, public spaces, and other areas within Mexican territory.cxliii While a 
verification visit involves INM agents arriving at residences and businesses to verify foreigners’ 
legal status in Mexico.cxliv  
 
In 2015, at the Southern Border Program’s peak, migratory inspections increased sharply across 
Mexico’s southern border region. In 2012, two years before the Southern Border Program was 
announced, INM agents conducted 14,368 inspections in the southern border states.cxlv In 2015, 
the INM conducted 25,623 inspections—nearly doubling 2012’s total. This upward trend persisted 
even after factoring in fluctuations in total migration levels. For example, in 2012, INM carried 
out nearly 8,400 inspections for every estimated 100,000 Central American migrants who were 
passing through the southern border states.cxlvi In 2015, INM conducted more than 13,000 
inspections per 100,000 migrants, the highest rate of migratory inspections to date.13  
 
Figure 8 
Total Migratory Inspections in Southern Border States (2012-2018) 
 
Source: INM transparency request, INM website 
 
                                               
13 To determine these rates, the authors calculated the number of Central American migrants transiting through 
Mexico each year by developing a model that draws on a wide range of U.S. and Mexican migration enforcement 
data. For more information and access to the model, see: Stephanie Leutert and Sarah Spalding, “How Many Central 
Americans Are Traveling North?” Lawfare Blog, March 14, 2019, https://www.lawfareblog.com/how-many-central-
americans-are-traveling-north. 
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These operations took place at a greater rate in the southern states of Veracruz, Chiapas, Oaxaca, 
and Tabasco than across the rest of the country. Between 2012 and 2013, INM conducted, on 
average, 68 percent of its migratory inspections within the southern border region. By 2014, the 
percent of operations had decreased, reaching only 58 percent. Yet, the following year, in 2015, 
INM once again picked up its operations in the southern states with roughly 64 percent of Mexico’s 
migratory inspections occurring in this region. In 2016, those numbers began a steep decline as 
INM started to shift its migration control operations to other parts of the country.  
 
Figure 9 
Migratory Inspections in Southern Border States as a Percent of Total Inspections in 
Mexico by Month (2012-2018)cxlvii 
 
Source: INM transparency request, INM website 
 
When compared to migratory inspections, the Southern Border Program had a limited effect on 
verification visits. These increased only slightly in 2015 and 2016, when it conducted roughly 
3,450 visits.cxlviii   
 
INM Joint Operations 
 
During the Southern Border Program, INM agents, who do not carry arms, worked closely with 
Mexican security forces to control irregular migration. Although INM is the sole agency tasked 
with apprehending, detaining, and deporting unauthorized migrants, it may partner with other 
agencies on a temporary basis. Mexico’s 2011 Migration Law authorizes the Federal Police to 
support INM agents throughout the country, while the Navy may support INM operations in 
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coastal states.14 Both government bodies hold official agreements with the INM that describe their 
legal authority to participate in joint operations and, in the case of the Federal Police, detail the 
process that INM must follow to request assistance.15cxlix While both agreements state that the 
participating agents must safeguard migrants’ human rights during joint operations, neither 
document contains guidelines surrounding security officials’ use of force. The 2011 Migration 
Law does not address the authority of the Army or state and municipal police agencies to 
participate in INM operations.16cl 
 
After the Southern Border Program was implemented, INM doubled the number of joint operations 
from 491 in 2014 to 1,074 in 2015.cli The Federal Police provided the most migratory enforcement 
support, participating in more than 30 percent of all interagency operations between 2014 and 
2017. Military forces participated in the second highest number of operations, with the Army and 
Navy engaging in 21 and 15 percent of joint operations, respectively. At times, these authorities 
outnumbered INM agents during joint operations.clii  
 
Yet, despite the higher numbers, joint operations continued to form the minority of INM 
enforcement actions under the Southern Border Program. In 2015, joint operations made up 
roughly 6 percent of INM’s enforcement activities in Chiapas, Oaxaca, and Tabasco.17 Figure 10 
shows each agency’s participation rate in joint operations conducted in these three states between 
2014 and 2017. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
14 Articles 81, 96, and 105 of the 2011 Migratory Law authorize the Federal Police to support the INM in migratory 
enforcement operations, and Article 83 of the Implementing Legislation of the Migratory Law states that the Navy 
(SEMAR) can collaborate with migration authorities at maritime ports of entry but does not provide additional 
details. The Navy’s authority to support the INM in coastal states stems from a 2006 joint agreement.  
15 The Federal Attorney General’s Office (PGR) also possesses an information-sharing agreement with INM, but the 
agreement does not address the PGR’s participation in migration control operations.  
16 Instead, these security agents may claim that their participation in INM operations was prompted not by migration 
concerns but by criminal actions committed by migrants.   
17 Veracruz was excluded from these calculations because its joint operations data is incomplete for the years 2014 
through 2016. 
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Figure 10 
Joint Operations by Agency as a Percent of Total Joint Operations (2014-2017)18’ 19 
 
Source: INM transparency request 
 
The Southern Border Program’s migration control strategy focused much of its interagency 
operations on migrants’ rail travel. On August 1, 2014—less than a month after the Southern 
Border Program was announced—the INM began to raid trains boarded by migrants in the Isthmus 
of Tehuantepec.cliii These enforcement actions involved multiple agencies including the Federal 
Attorney General’s Office, Army, Federal Police, Navy, the government of Chiapas, and private 
railway representatives.cliv With the support of the Marines and the Navy, INM agents reportedly 
removed migrants from cargo trains and prevented them from boarding the trains altogether. INM 
agents patrolled train routes, while marines erected physical barriers to block migrants from 
approaching railways.clv Some of these operations were large-scale. According to Friar Tomas 
González, former coordinator of La 72 migrant shelter, at the program’s peak, as many as 100 
agents carried out raids on a single train in Tenosique, Chiapas.clvi  
 
Although INM’s joint operations particularly targeted trains, agents also carried out operations at 
other points along migration routes. Migrants reported that INM and other agencies stationed 
patrols outside migrant shelters and raided migrants’ hotel rooms.clvii INM agents also conducted 
operations at bus stations and increased the number of checkpoints along major highways. Under 
the Southern Border Program, the number of vehicles that authorities stopped for carrying irregular 
                                               
18 Figure 10 includes joint operations within only Chiapas, Tabasco, and Oaxaca. 
19 In Figure 10, “Border Police” refers to a 135-member subunit within the Chiapas state border police. 
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migrants rose by 10 percent in Mexico’s southern states.clviii Civil society groups have alleged that 
these enforcement actions involved racial profiling. They point to cases in which Mexican citizens 
were mistakenly detained by INM officials, who claimed that they could detect migrants by their 
“nervous behavior, their skin color and mode of dress, and above all their smell.”clix   
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Chapter 5: Southern Border Program Effects (2014-2015) 
 
The Southern Border Program’s changes to INM infrastructure, personnel, and operations created 
a series of effects for Central American migrants. These effects included increased apprehensions 
and deportations, changes in how and where migrants traveled in Mexico, the frequency with 
which migrants hired guides to pass through the country, and an increase in the average price of 
those guides. The most dramatic effects occurred in late 2014 through the end of 2015.  
 
Apprehensions2021 
 
Due to the INM’s increased number of checkpoints, personnel, and migratory operations, 
apprehensions of migrants in Mexico increased significantly under the Southern Border Program. 
This trend was particularly clear in Chiapas, Tabasco, Veracruz, and Oaxaca, and between 2013 
and 2015, apprehensions rose by 134 percent in these four states alone—making up more than 
three quarters of total apprehensions across the country.22 Figure 11 shows the increase in 
apprehensions in the southern border states after the Southern Border Program’s June 2014 
announcement. After a brief dip in December 2014, apprehensions nearly doubled the following 
month and remained high through 2015.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
20 All data in this section (with the exception of cited CBP data) is from SEGOB’s Boletínes Estadísticos for 2012-
2018. The following datasets were used for each year: “Eventos de extranjeros presentados ante la autoridad 
migratoria, según entidad federativa”; “Eventos de extranjeros presentados ante la autoridad migratoria, según 
continente, país de nacionalidad y entidad federativa”; “Eventos de extranjeros devueltos por la autoridad migratoria 
mexicana, según entidad federativa y tipo de resolución.” 
21 Deportations are not discussed in the apprehensions section because the majority of apprehended Central 
Americans are ultimately deported. 
22 This totaled 86,807 additional apprehensions. 
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Figure 11 
Apprehensions in Southern Border States by Month (2013-2015) 
 
 Source: SEGOB 
 
These increased apprehensions appear to be from the greater number of INM operations, rather 
than an alternative explanation, such as a larger number of migrants passing through Mexico. 
Using estimates of Central American migration and calculating the rate of apprehensions in both 
the United States and Mexico per 100,000 irregular migrants, the data rules out this possibility.23  
 
Between fiscal years 2014 and 2015, apprehensions of Central Americans at the U.S. southwest 
border decreased by nearly 45 percent (see Figure 12). In Mexico, the number of apprehended 
Central Americans during this time period increased by nearly 70 percent. The data show an 
inverse relationship between enforcement actions in Mexico’s southern border region and the 
number of apprehensions at the U.S. border. While reducing the number of migrants arriving at 
the United States was never a stated goal of the program, this data suggests that the Southern 
Border Program did play a role in temporarily stemming migrant transit to the United States.  
 
 
 
                                               
23 To determine these rates, the authors calculated the number of Central American irregular migrants transiting 
through Mexico each year by developing a model that draws on a wide range of U.S. and Mexican migration 
enforcement statistics. For more information and access to the model, see: Stephanie Leutert and Sarah Spalding, 
“How Many Central Americans Are Traveling North?” Lawfare Blog, March 14, 2019, 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/how-many-central-americans-are-traveling-north. 
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Figure 12 
Percent Change in Apprehensions of Central Americans at the U.S. Southwest Border 
versus Mexico (FY2012-2018) 
 
Source: SEGOB, U.S. Customs and Border Protection 
 
Migrant Travel 
 
The Southern Border Program’s increased operations and apprehensions changed the way that 
some migrants traveled through Mexico. As operations began to increase along train routes and 
highways, migrants began to look for alternative and more isolated routes.clx Broadly speaking, 
INM operations did not change overall migration routes. They did, however, create what the 
Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) calls a “multiplication of routes.”clxi The starting, 
middle, and end points of migrants’ routes stayed the same, but the pathways and transportation 
methods used along those routes diversified. These isolated routes can be more dangerous than 
traditional routes, given the absence of migrant shelters or civil society organizations that provide 
migrants with humanitarian assistance.clxii  
 
Along with this change in routes, migrants adopted different forms of transportation.clxiii Survey 
data from the College of the Northern Border (Colegio de la Frontera Norte, COLEF) of Central 
Americans deported from the United States show that migrants’ use of cars, trailers, buses, and 
trains all decreased in 2014, likely due to increased INM operations.clxiv The use of trains was 
already declining by 2013, but there was a particularly sharp decrease in 2014 for train use among 
Hondurans, with the percent using a train dropping from 41 percent to 25 percent.clxv In 2015, the 
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use of cars, buses, and trailers as forms of transportation rebounded to above their pre-2014 levels, 
while train use never recovered to its earlier levels.clxvi 
 
As INM operations increased, migrants increasingly relied on guides.24 These guides physically 
transport migrants across Mexico, helping them to pass through or circumvent checkpoints. To 
facilitate this transportation, these guides also pay bribes to corrupt government officials or 
criminal groups to help secure migrants' passage. From 2012 to 2015, the percent of migrants using 
guides increased from 45 percent to 57 percent, as seen in Figure 13. This figure is also likely an 
underestimate, given that this data comes from surveys of Central Americans deported from the 
United States, and does not include many families or unaccompanied children who use guides at 
higher rates and seek legal protections once they reach U.S. territory.  
 
Figure 13 
Percent of Migrants Using a Guide to Transit Through Mexico (2011-2017) 
 
Source: COLEF 
 
Along with the increase in people traveling through Mexico with guides, the price of these services 
increased under the Southern Border Program.25 From 2013 to 2014 the price that Central 
Americans reported paying for a guide went up by 22 percent. One theory for why the cost of a 
                                               
24 Guides are also referred to as smugglers, coyotes, or polleros. 
25 Rodrigo Soberanes Santín, “El Plan Frontera Sur, Según Los Coyotes,” En el Camino (blog), June 16, 2015, 
https://enelcamino.piedepagina.mx/ruta/el-plan-frontera-sur-segun-los-coyotes/.  
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guide may have increased after the Southern Border Program’s implementation is that guides had 
to pay higher bribes to officials and these costs were passed down to migrants.clxvii  
 
Figure 14 
Average Cost of a Guide in USD (2011-2017)26’ 27’ clxviii 
 
Source: COLEF 
 
Crimes Against Migrants 
 
The Southern Border Program also coincided with an increase in reported crimes against migrants 
in Mexico. This increase has been a source of criticism among human rights activists, and was 
reported by a number of organizations such as the International Crisis Group (ICG), the Council 
on Hemispheric Affairs (COHA), and WOLA.clxix These groups argue that Mexico prioritized 
migrant apprehensions over actions designed to improve migrant safety.clxx As a result, migrants 
increasingly became victim to serious abuses in their journey to the United States. For example, 
according to an investigation by Animal Político, kidnappings of irregular migrants in Mexico’s 
southern border states increased by 166 percent during the first year of the Southern Border 
Program.clxxi 
 
                                               
26 All responses regarding costs were converted into USD. 
27 This chart was created using COLEF interview data from 2011 to 2017. As of April 26, 2019, the 2018 data was 
not available. 
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There are various potential reasons behind the increase in crimes, including: 1) More frequent 
encounters with authorities due to expanded INM operations during this time period; 2) Migrants 
taking clandestine and remote routes to evade migration authorities that left them more at risk to 
the elements and criminal actors; and 3) Criminal actors moving into migrant exploitation activities 
as migration numbers increased within Mexico. Yet the higher number of crimes corresponds to 
greater rates of victimization and not just larger numbers of migrants transiting through the 
country. This conclusion was reached by using state prosecutor’s office’s crime numbers and 
estimates of the Central American migrant population passing through Mexico every year.28 Using 
this methodology, there was a 140 percent increase in the rate of crimes against migrants from 
2014 to 2015 in Mexico’s southern border region.  
 
Figure 15 
Crimes per 100,000 Migrants in Southern Border States (2012-2017)29 
 
Source: Chiapas, Veracruz, Oaxaca, Tabasco State Prosecutors transparency requests and author’s 
calculations 
 
 
 
                                               
28 To determine these rates, the authors calculated the number of Central American irregular migrants transiting 
through Mexico each year by developing a model that draws on a wide range of U.S. and Mexican migration 
enforcement statistics. For more information and access to the model, see: Stephanie Leutert and Sarah Spalding, 
“How Many Central Americans Are Traveling North?” Lawfare Blog, March 14, 2019, 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/how-many-central-americans-are-traveling-north. 
29 This chart includes data from Chiapas, Veracruz, Oaxaca, and Tabasco.  
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Crimes Against Migrants Committed by Authorities 
 
As mentioned, one possible explanation for the increase in crimes are the more frequent 
interactions between migrants and Mexican authorities.clxxii In line with this explanation, the 
Documentation Network of Migrant Defender Organizations (Red de Documentación de las 
Organizaciones Defensoras de Migrantes, REDODEM), which obtains its data from interviews 
with irregular migrants at shelters, reported that the percent of crimes against migrants by Mexican 
authorities increased by about 50 percent from 2014 to 2015.clxxiii  
 
According to REDODEM, police forces—primarily the Federal Police—accounted for 81 percent 
of crimes against migrants committed by authorities in 2015, an increase of 32 percent from 
2014.clxxiv However, contrary to REDODEM, data from Mexico’s National Human Rights 
Commission (Comisión Nacional de los Derechos Humanos, CNDH), aggregated through formal 
complaints from victims, indicates that police forces accounted for only 13 percent of human rights 
violations against migrants in 2015, although these rates did see a 60 percent increase the year the 
Southern Border Program was implemented.clxxv Instead, the CNDH reported that INM was the 
main perpetrator of human rights violations against migrants by authorities, accounting for 84 
percent of violations in 2015, an increase of 46 percent from the previous year.clxxvi  
 
Figure 16 
Percent of Crimes Against Migrants Committed by Authorities (2013-2017) 
 
Source: REDODEM 
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Efforts to Address Crimes Against Migrants 
 
After the Southern Border Program’s July 2014 implementation, Mexican states also created 
specialized prosecutor’s offices for crimes against migrants. Specialized prosecutor’s offices 
opened in Tabasco (December 2014), Campeche (May 2015), and Quintana Roo (June 2015).30 In 
2015, the federal Attorney General’s Office also created the Unit for the Investigation of Crimes 
for Migrants (Unidad de Investigación de Delitos para Personas Migrantes, UIDPM) to 
investigate federal crimes against migrants, as well as the Mechanism for Foreign Support 
(Mecanismo de Apoyo Exterior, MAE) for migrants and their families outside of Mexico to report 
crimes that had occurred within the country.clxxvii  
 
Despite these efforts, migrant crime reports have gone virtually unpunished, as 99 percent of 
crimes against migrants end without convictions.clxxviii Much of this impunity is due to challenges 
within Mexico’s judicial system, affecting both migrants and Mexican nationals. Additionally, 
many migrants never report crimes out of fear of deportation or do so only later when they are 
outside the state where the crime occurred.clxxix Other migrants simply abandon their cases in order 
to continue their journeys northward. 
 
  
                                               
30 The specialized prosecutor’s office in Chiapas opened in 2013.  
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Chapter 6: Southern Border Program Legacy (2016-2018) 
 
As of September 2018, Mexican government reports indicated that the Southern Border Program 
was still technically active, although the program is not operating at previous levels.clxxx After the 
Southern Border Program’s announcement in July 2014, its peak operations took place through 
the end of 2015. In the following years, many aspects of the program—such as programming 
through its governing body, operations, and apprehensions—diminished while other aspects have 
endured. This chapter focuses on the program’s structural legacy, its implementation legacy, and 
its residual effects on migrants.  
 
Structural Legacy 
 
Since 2015, CAIMFS’s budget has steadily declined (as seen in Figure 17). In 2019, CAIMFS 
budget was US$2.2 million, or roughly one third its initial budget of US$6.92 million.clxxxi Along 
with a decreased budget, the number of personnel has also declined. A 2019 transparency request 
noted that there were seven CAIMFS employees, and only one who has worked there since its 
founding in 2014.31clxxxii 
 
Figure 17 
CAIMFS Budget in Millions USD (2015-2019) 
 
Source: SEGOB transparency request 
 
                                               
31 For more information on CAIMFS personnel over time, please see Appendix 3. 
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Since 2015, CAIMFS has continued to coordinate activities at CAITFs throughout the southern 
border.clxxxiii Additionally, SEGOB has continued to report on CAIMFS’s social programming 
initiatives throughout Mexico, which have included general medical services; school campus 
renovations; workshops on bullying, alcoholism, and domestic violence; community kitchens; free 
haircuts; and public service announcements regarding human rights, gender equity, and migratory 
legislation.clxxxiv CAIMFS also has an office in Mexico City located only blocks from the main 
SEGOB building.32 However, despite these activities and physical presence, CAIMFS does not 
have an agency website, despite Article 70 of the Transparency Law that requires all governing 
bodies to have a public and up-to-date website with information on programs.clxxxv  
 
Implementation Legacy 
 
During the Southern Border Program’s peak, various government bodies constructed enforcement 
infrastructure throughout the southern border region. This infrastructure continues to exist, and 
various government agencies continue to leverage these facilities in their daily activities. 
 
CAITFs and Fixed Checkpoints 
 
Soon after the Southern Border Program’s announcement, three CAITFs opened across Chiapas 
and these facilities continue to operate through today. Two additional facilities—one in Palenque, 
Chiapas and another in Centla, Tabasco—were set to open in 2017 and 2018, respectively. These 
plans were stalled when construction funds were reallocated to address the damage from the 
September 2017 earthquakes that impacted Oaxaca, Morelos, and Mexico City.clxxxvi A 2019 
transparency request from CAIMFS indicates that it still intends to complete the two facilities to 
fulfill the Southern Border Program’s objectives. Yet there are no specifics as to when the 
construction process will be completed.clxxxvii Figure 18 shows the locations of the three CAITFs 
and the locations of the two additional CAITFs that are pending completion.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
32 Confirmed in March 2019 by an employee at the Unit of Migratory Policy (Unidad de Política Migratoria). 
  
 
38 
Figure 18 
Operational and Planned CAITF Facilities 
 
Source: CAIMFS, INM, SCT, SEMAR, and SRE transparency requests 
 
INM’s consistent budget allocations for CAITF activities confirms that these facilities continue to 
be an important aspect of Mexico’s migration enforcement strategy. Since the CAITFs opened, 
INM’s budgets for their activities has remained unchanged (La Trinitaria) or steadily increased 
(Playas de Catazajá).clxxxviii The Huixtla facility is the exception, which had its budget nearly 
halved in 2017. (For more information on CAITF budgets, please see Appendix 4).clxxxix In 
addition, the number of INM personnel stationed at each CAITF has remained relatively constant 
since each facility began operations: the Huixtla CAITF currently has 14 stationed INM agents, in 
comparison to 16 from 2014 to 2017; La Trinitaria has maintained four agents since operations 
started in 2014; and Playas de Catazajá had five agents until 2019 when this number was reduced 
to three.cxc Fixed checkpoints continue to be used for migration enforcement throughout the 
southern border states, although, since 2016, their use may have plateaued or slightly decreased.33 
 
 
 
                                               
33 In March 2017, Adam Isacson of WOLA counted 10 checkpoints on the Chiapas Pacific Highway between 
Tapachula and Arriaga. At the time, he suspected that there was an equal or perhaps slightly greater number on other 
major roads, such as the Inter-American Highway through Comitán, as well as the road through Ocosingo to 
Palenque. However, since 2016, Mr. Isacson believes the use of mobile checkpoints has either plateaued or 
decreased. 
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Naval Facilities 
 
As discussed in this report’s Southern Border Program Implementation section, the construction 
of Advanced Naval Stations was incorporated into the Southern Border Program. As of 2015, 
four of the stations were complete but information about the status of the remaining nine bases 
was unavailable. The four Advanced Naval Stations likely continue to serve their intended 
purpose of protecting migrants and promoting security under the Southern Border Program.cxci 
 
Personnel Deployment  
 
As part of the Southern Border Program, there was an increase in INM personnel deployed to the 
southern border states. Since this initial increase, the number of agents stationed in these states has 
decreased to pre-Southern Border Program levels, particularly in Tabasco and Veracruz. However, 
as a percent of total active INM agents, the amount stationed in the southern border states (roughly 
26 percent) has not changed since 2015. Chiapas has had the largest share of active INM agents in 
Mexico, with roughly 13 percent of all active INM agents located within the state.cxcii Figure 19 
shows that the number of INM agents in Chiapas has remained consistently high from the start of 
the Southern Border Program through 2019.cxciii 
 
Figure 19 
Number of Active INM Agents (2015-2019) 
 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
Chiapas 284 284 281 289 289 
Oaxaca 80 80 77 75 75 
Tabasco 97 97 88 78 78 
Veracruz 141 141 137 131 131 
Total in Southern Border 602 602 583 573 573 
Total Outside Southern Border 1698 1698 1660 1667 1667 
Total INM Active Agents 2300 2300 2243 2240 2240 
Source: SEGOB 
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INM Operations 
 
After the Southern Border Program’s implementation, INM operations and joint operations 
increased in the southern border states of Chiapas, Oaxaca, Tabasco, and Veracruz. By 2016, 
however, INM’s enforcement actions had already begun to decline, and by 2017, migratory 
inspections had fallen below pre-Southern Border Program levels. In 2017, INM conducted just 
6,961 migratory inspections in the region—roughly half the number carried out in 2013, the year 
before the Southern Border Program took effect.cxciv These migration control activities shifted to 
other parts of Mexico, with particularly steep declines in Oaxaca and Veracruz. In 2015, during 
the height of the Southern Border Program, 64 percent of INM operations occurred in the southern 
border region. By 2018, that number had flipped, and 64 percent of operations took place outside 
the southern states.cxcv   
 
Figure 20 
Total Migratory Inspections in the Southern Border States (2012-2018) 
 
Source: INM transparency requests 
 
Migration patterns do not account for these declines. This report calculated the rate of INM 
operations using estimates of the Central American migrant population transiting through Mexico 
each year.34 In the four years after Southern Border Program’s announcement, Central American 
                                               
34 To determine these rates, the authors calculated the number of Central American irregular migrants transiting 
through Mexico each year by developing a model that draws on a wide range of U.S. and Mexican migration 
enforcement statistics. For more information and access to the model, see: Stephanie Leutert and Sarah Spalding, 
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migration numbers fluctuated but ultimately increased from an estimated 311,000 Central 
Americans entering Mexico in 2014 to 314,000 in 2018. During the same time period, the number 
of INM operations declined significantly.  
 
Figures 21 and 22 show the decline in INM operations and joint operations throughout the southern 
border region after 2015, both in terms of raw numbers and relative to the population of Central 
American migrants transiting Mexico. Similar trajectories between the two lines suggest that 
operational declines are due to changes to INM enforcement priorities, rather than changes in 
migration patterns. This decline in operations takes place amid only slightly declining numbers of 
INM personnel in the southern border region, raising questions about possible changes to 
workloads and activities within the agency. 
 
Figure 21 
INM Operations in Southern Border States (2012-2018) 
 
Source: INM transparency requests and authors’ calculations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
“How Many Central Americans Are Traveling North?” Lawfare Blog, March 14, 2019, 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/how-many-central-americans-are-traveling-north. 
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Figure 22 
Joint Operations in Southern Border States (2014-2017)cxcvi 
 
Source: INM transparency request and authors’ calculations3536 
 
INM Joint Operations 
 
Although the number of joint operations declined after 2015, they comprised a slightly larger 
proportion of INM’s total operations by 2017, at roughly 8 percent (compared to 6 percent in 
2015). Between September 2017 and June 2018, INM conducted 308 operations with the Navy, 
Army, Federal Police, Federal Attorney General’s Office, and Mexico’s tax authority (Secretaría 
de Hacienda y Crédito Público, SHCP).cxcvii  
 
As previously described, the legal basis for some agencies’ cooperation remains uncertain.cxcviii 
This is particularly the case for state or municipal police, which are not authorized under the 
2011 Migratory Act nor in any other publicly available documents to participate in migration 
control operations. When contacted via transparency requests, state level security forces stated 
that they were unable to produce evidence of agreements authorizing their participation in joint 
                                               
35 To determine these rates, the authors calculated the number of Central American irregular migrants transiting 
through Mexico each year by developing a model that draws on a wide range of U.S. and Mexican migration 
enforcement statistics. For more information and access to the model, see: Stephanie Leutert and Sarah Spalding, 
“How Many Central Americans Are Traveling North?” Lawfare Blog, March 14, 2019, 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/how-many-central-americans-are-traveling-north. 
36 Figure 22 includes data for Chiapas, Oaxaca, and Tabasco. Veracruz’s information was incomplete for the years 
2014-2016 and was therefore excluded from the dataset. 
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INM operations.cxcix Despite this lack of clear legal authorization, in 2017, Veracruz state police 
partnered with INM in 12 different operations—more than 40 percent of the joint operations 
conducted in Veracruz that year.37cc Veracruz’s police forces explicitly stated in a transparency 
request that they do not hold any joint agreements with INM.cci  
 
The lack of agreements with INM and guidelines for joint operations can have consequences for 
migrants. For example, in September 2018, irregular migrants filed a complaint with the CNDH 
accusing Veracruz state police, along with INM and Federal Police agents, of forcefully removing 
them from a train in a raid near Juan Rodríguez Clara, Veracruz. The migrants alleged that agents 
shot at them, beat them, and tortured some by cutting off their fingers. Officials from both agencies 
were also accused of attempting to hide the bodies of at least two people that had been killed during 
the operation.ccii   
 
In April 2019, President Andrés Manuel López Obrador announced that his newly-proposed 
National Guard (Guardia Nacional), a hybrid military-police force, would have the authority to 
review immigration documents and arrest migrants in cooperation with the INM. National Guard 
agents would be stationed throughout border zones and along highways.  
 
Effects Legacy 
 
Apprehensions  
 
In 2016—mirroring the decreasing number of operations—the number of apprehensions in 
Mexico’s southern border states also began to decline. From 2015 to 2016, apprehensions fell in 
nearly every state, with the largest drops in Chiapas, Tabasco, Veracruz, and Oaxaca. These 
apprehensions continued to drop in the following years, and apprehensions in the southern border 
states decreased by 55 percent from 2015 to 2018. Apprehensions in this region also decreased 
relative to total apprehensions across the country. In 2015, apprehensions in the southern border 
region made up 77 percent of Mexico’s total apprehensions, but by 2018, this had dropped to 69 
percent. These levels are relatively consistent with pre-the Southern Border Program apprehension 
levels, suggesting a return to the status quo for Mexico’s migratory enforcement.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
37 Diego Lorente, coordinator of the Fray Matías de Córdova Human Rights Center (Centro de Derechos Humanos 
Fray Matías de Córdova) reported that Grupo Beta, a small INM unit tasked with providing humanitarian aid to 
migrants, has also at times supported INM enforcement actions by transporting distressed migrants to INM agents, 
in violation of its mission.  
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Figure 23 
Change in Apprehensions (2015-2018)38 
 
     Source: SEGOB 
 
This post-2015 reversal to pre-Southern Border Program migratory enforcement levels is also 
apparent when comparing Mexico’s apprehensions to those at the U.S.-Mexico border. In 2016, 
as Mexico eased its migration efforts at the southern border, U.S. apprehensions increased by 
nearly 50 percent. From 2016 onward, Mexico and the United States began to once again follow 
similar apprehension patterns in terms of apprehensions. Similar to decreasing apprehensions, this 
trend also suggests that Mexico’s migration enforcement has returned to the status quo. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
38 The gradient indicates the difference in apprehensions between the two years. 
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Figure 24 
Percent Change in Apprehensions of Central Americans at the U.S. Southwest Border vs. 
Mexico (FY2012-2018) 
 
Source: SEGOB, U.S. Customs and Border Protection 
 
Lastly, apprehensions in Mexico did not decline because fewer people were migrating. In fact, the 
number of Central American migrants traveling through Mexico is estimated to have remained 
relatively steady since fiscal year 2016.cciii During fiscal years 2015 to 2016, Mexico’s 
apprehension rate per 100,000 migrants declined by 37 percent, while the U.S. apprehension rate 
increased by 7 percent. This suggests a change in apprehension practices and policies rather than 
a shift in migration patterns.  
 
Migrant Travel 
 
After the Southern Border Program’s implementation, irregular migrants’ modes of transportation 
shifted. Most notably, while the percent of migrants reporting taking cars, trailers, and buses to 
cross through Mexico returned to pre-Southern Border Program levels, the use of rail travel never 
recovered.cciv There are several possible explanations for why train usage has continued to decline 
despite fewer INM operations, including: 1) Migrants increasingly rely on guides, who tend to 
prefer transporting migrants in vehicles; and 2) There has been an increase in families and 
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unaccompanied minors transiting through Mexico, who tend to prefer the relative safety of cars, 
buses, and trailers to the hazards that come with riding atop a freight train.39ccv   
 
Figure 25 
Percent of Migrants Using a Train to Transit Through Mexico (2012-2017)ccvi 
 
Source: COLEF 
 
For two years after the Southern Border Program’s implementation, the percent of deported 
Central American migrants who reported using a guide in Mexico increased steadily.ccvii From 
2015 to 2016 the percent of migrants using a guide increased from 57 percent to 61 percent, 
although there was a slight decrease in 2017.40 At the same time, the price of a guide also increased. 
As of 2017, the average price per person to transit through Mexico with a guide was $4,241, an 
increase of 42 percent since 2014. This price does not include the additional price of crossing the 
U.S.-Mexico border.ccviii 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
39 According to COLEF surveys, Hondurans—generally single adults—have begun taking the train again at numbers 
that are higher than Guatemalans or Salvadorans. 
40 This trend comes from interviews of deported individuals. Generally, the respondents are single males while, on the 
whole, the demographics of migrants today are families and unaccompanied minors who would not be reflected in the 
data.  
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Figure 26 
Percent of Migrants Using a Guide to Transit Through Mexico (2011-2017) 
 
Source: COLEF 
 
Crimes Against Migrants 
 
Since migration enforcement operations under the Southern Border Program began to decline in 
2016, crimes against migrants in the southern border region have also decreased. From 2015 to 
2017, the rate of crime against migrants—as measured using crime data from state prosecutors’ 
offices and estimates of the number of migrants transiting Mexico—dropped by 39 percent. While 
2017 levels are not as low as pre-Southern Border Program rates, the combination of the crime 
uptick in 2015, as INM operations increased, and the 2017 decline, as these operations decreased, 
suggests that the Southern Border Program may have had an influence on crimes against migrants. 
However, other factors may also have impacted the rates of crimes against migrants, such as 
motivations to report crimes, the overall security situation in the region, and shifting criminal 
dynamics (such as the decline of Los Zetas in the southern border region and the fragmenting of 
criminal groups), among others.ccix   
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Figure 27 
Crimes per 100,000 Migrants in Southern Border States (2012-2017) 
 
Source: Chiapas, Veracruz, Oaxaca, Tabasco State Prosecutors transparency requests and author’s 
calculations 
 
The percent of these crimes that were committed by Mexican authorities also decreased from 2015 
levels. According to REDODEM, in 2015, 42 percent of crimes against migrants were committed 
by Mexican authorities, but this percent was 17 percent and 25 percent in 2016 and 2017, 
respectively. Additionally, in 2015, REDODEM reported that police forces accounted for 81 
percent of crimes against migrants that were committed by authorities, but by 2017 this had 
dropped to 40.9 percent.41ccx CNDH crime statistics indicate that INM continued to be the primary 
perpetrators, making up 77 percent of all abuses against migrants by authorities in 2018, and that 
police forces were responsible for 11 percent of human rights abuses against migrants in 2017.42ccxi  
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
41 This may not be due to an actual decrease, however, as INM abuses, undetermined authorities, and “other” were 
first added as response categories in 2016 and private train security was first mentioned in 2017. This may simply 
suggest that more authorities are now being accounted for rather than a true decline in police force abuses. 
42 As previously mentioned, the discrepancy in reporting from REDODEM and CNDH can likely be attributed to the 
difference in sources and the sources’ motivations to disclose sensitive information. REDODEM receives its data 
from interviews with migrants at shelters while CNDH is an official government body and receives formal 
complaints from victims. 
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Figure 28 
Percent of Crimes Against Migrants Committed by Authorities (2013-2017) 
 
Source: REDODEM 
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Chapter 7: Recommendations 
 
This chapter offers four policy recommendations to regularize migration, establish the legality of 
joint operations, increase government transparency, and boost development in Mexico’s southern 
border region. 
 
1. Increase Legal Pathways and Foster Orderly Migration in Mexico  
 
Under Mexico’s 2011 Migratory Law, unauthorized migration is considered an administrative 
infraction with a fine of up to MX$5,000 (US$260).ccxii The law states: “In no event is irregular 
migratory status on its own considered the perpetration of a crime, nor will it be considered the 
perpetration of illicit acts by the migrant as the result of his or her not being documented.”ccxiii In 
line with this law, the Southern Border Program’s first point of action was to create regularized, 
orderly migration into Mexico. However, despite Mexican legislation and the Southern Border 
Program’s stated objectives, the program has focused overwhelmingly on arresting, detaining, and 
deporting migrants.  
 
This policy proposal outlines a long-term path to move toward regularized and orderly migration. 
It is an approach that is designed to encourage migrants to present themselves to immigration 
authorities upon entering Mexico instead of seeking clandestine routes to evade detection. Creating 
these new legal pathways would fulfill Mexico’s legal obligations and decrease migrants’ 
vulnerability to crimes.  
  
The López Obrador administration should extend the geographic range of regional worker 
visas. As the first point of action for the Southern Border Program, former President Peña Nieto 
announced that Mexico would issue more temporary entry permits for Guatemalans and Belizeans 
seeking to visit or work in Mexico. These permits were not granted to citizens of Honduras or El 
Salvador, two of the major sending countries for transit migrants. In March 2019, President López 
Obrador extended Border Worker Visitor Cards (Tarjeta de Visitante Trabajador Fronterizo, 
TVTF) to Hondurans and Salvadorans, allowing citizens of all Northern Triangle countries to work 
in the southern border states of Chiapas, Tabasco, Campeche, and Quintana Roo for up to one year, 
with the option of renewal.ccxiv  
 
However, many of the states included in TVTFs have small labor markets and high unemployment 
rates.ccxv Migrants may face difficulties securing employment in the southern border region and 
may continue onward to other parts of the country or to the United States without migratory 
documentation. Additionally, in these small labor markets with high unemployment rates, the 
presence of abundant immigrant labor may also pose an unwelcome source of job competition for 
Mexican workers.   
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Yet, the López Obrador administration has also noted that many states throughout Mexico face 
labor shortages.ccxvi TVTFs should be extended to these states, as determined by the Ministry of 
Labor and Social Welfare (Secretaría del Trabajo y Previsión Social, STPS). For example, TVTFs 
could be extended northward to Mexico’s central region, a manufacturing hub with numerous 
employment opportunities for citizens and non-citizens alike. As Mexico’s economy continues to 
improve, the López Obrador administration could extend these visas to include all Mexican states.  
 
To assist migrants in finding jobs and obtaining the offer-of-employment letters required for 
TVTFs, civil society groups and private sector associations should network with trade and business 
associations to identify employment opportunities for migrants, creating and relying on a migrant-
employer database to remotely help interested workers.  
 
INM should continue to grant humanitarian visas for Central American migrants in need of 
international protection. Under the 2011 Migratory Law, INM grants humanitarian visas 
(Tarjetas de Visitante por Razones Humanitarias, TVRH) to foreigners who: 1) are the victims or 
witnesses of a crime in Mexico; 2) are unaccompanied minors; or 3) have requested asylum, 
refugee status, or complementary protection, and whose applications are still in process. According 
to the law, INM may also grant humanitarian visas to “foreigners who do not fall under the 
foregoing categories when there is a humanitarian cause or cause for public interest that makes 
their admission into Mexico or regularization necessary.”ccxvii Humanitarian visas allow recipients 
to live, work, access education and basic medical services, and travel in Mexico for one year. 
  
Individuals from the Northern Triangle should be able to receive these visas for any of the reasons 
listed above. They should also qualify if they might be eligible for international protection. These 
visas could be granted to migrants identified as “vulnerable” in Articles 2 and 73 of the 2011 
Migratory Law, including: women; minors and adolescents; indigenous individuals; differently-
abled individuals; the elderly; and crime victims.ccxviii  
 
Individuals who do not fit into these categories could apply for a humanitarian visa and receive 
special screening. These interviews, along with humanitarian visa processing, could take place at 
INM offices in Tabasco and Chiapas. They could also take place at application centers for Border 
Worker Visitor Cards or at Mexican consulates located in Northern Triangle countries. In addition 
to the interview process, INM should screen humanitarian visa applicants for criminal records, 
taking their biometrics information and registering their identity documents, if available. To 
encourage migrants’ long-term stay in Mexico, humanitarian visa cards could allow recipients the 
option of applying for more permanent legal status in Mexico, if they meet certain standards.ccxix  
 
Inform migrants of their international rights, of their legal and employment options, and of 
safety conditions within Mexican territory. INM should collaborate with civil society groups via 
the INM Citizens Council, UNHCR, and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) to 
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provide migrants with up-to-date and accurate information about 1) applying for refugee status in 
Mexico; 2) the locations of REDODEM migrant shelters throughout Mexico; 3) employers and 
municipalities willing to hire migrant workers; 4) information about current U.S.-Mexico policies 
such as metering and the Migrant Protection Protocols; 5) their national and international rights as 
migrants; and 6) processes for seeking legal protection in other countries, including but not limited 
to the United States, Canada, Costa Rica, Panama, and Belize. To reduce costs, INM and the INM 
Citizens Council could seek assistance from civil society groups and NGOs in communicating this 
information to migrants.43ccxx  
 
INM could also work with the UNHCR to connect employers throughout Mexico with recipients 
of humanitarian visas and Border Worker Visitors Cards, facilitating migrants’ dispersal 
throughout Mexico and working to prevent an unsustainable concentration of migrants at the U.S.-
Mexico border. They could also extend IOM’s “municipal job fair for migrants” (feria municipal 
de empleo para personas en contexto de migración), held in Tijuana for the second year running, 
to other welcoming municipalities throughout Mexico.ccxxi   
 
2. Clarify Legal Mandates for Authorities Engaging in Migratory Operations 
 
As of April 2019, INM appears to have signed collaboration agreements with the Federal Police 
and the Navy.44 However, according to INM data, the agency has conducted joint operations with 
a range of other actors, including state and municipal police forces, the Army, and state 
prosecutor’s offices. Although the number of these joint operations began to decrease in 2016, 
they continue to occur on a regular basis.ccxxii The lack of explicit legal authority, accountability 
mechanisms, and use of force guidelines for most of the agencies engaged in these joint operations 
creates opportunities for abuse of power and puts migrants at risk.  
 
The Migratory Law or its implementing legislation should explicitly delineate guidelines for all 
authorities that can engage in joint migratory enforcement operations. To achieve this legislative 
clarity, Mexico’s Congress should update Articles 81, 96, and 105 of the Migratory Law and 
Article 83 of the Implementing Guidelines of the Migratory Law to expressly state that only 
entities listed in these articles are authorized to support INM operationally. These articles should 
require that INM create joint agreements with the other entities that clearly delineate 
responsibilities and define appropriate use of force as they relate to migration enforcement.  
 
The proposed National Guard provides an opportunity to implement these changes. The Mexican 
government should incorporate guidelines surrounding the National Guard’s responsibilities, 
protocols, and use of force during joint operations with INM into new legislation. Using the 
                                               
43 The UNHCR and IOM are already involved in similar activities. 
44 The federal Attorney General’s Office also has a joint agreement with INM for information sharing. The 
agreement does not address operations. 
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National Guard as a model, the Mexican government should develop and enact similar guidelines 
for all other agencies that support INM in its operations.   
 
The INM and Attorney General’s Office should establish accountability mechanisms to ensure 
authorities operate within their legal mandates and do not abuse their powers. The INM should 
establish and fully fund its Internal Affairs Unit—which was mandated in SEGOB’s 2013 Internal 
Regulations—in order to investigate INM agents who are alleged to be involved in misconduct. It 
should refer any serious cases to the Attorney General’s office.ccxxiii Mexico’s Congress should 
provide INM with the necessary funding to establish this unit. In the interim, the INM’s current 
Internal Control Body—a unit in the INM that imposes administrative sanctions on agents if they 
do not fulfill their duties—should implement sanctions on agents engaging in misconduct and use 
its discretion to remove agents if necessary.45ccxxiv Both the Internal Control Body and the Internal 
Affairs Unit should be required to report all significant violations to the Attorney General to take 
the appropriate legal action.ccxxv  
 
As part of this effort, the INM should also ensure that individuals can anonymously report 
wrongdoings without penalty. Mexico’s 2017 General Law of Administrative Responsibilities, a 
sweeping anti-corruption law, provides a whistleblowing framework that applies to all levels of 
government. It does not, however, prohibit dismissal or punishment should an individual’s identity 
be disclosed.ccxxvi To ensure these protections for INM and other government employees, Mexico 
should prohibit employers from dismissing or punishing any whistleblowers without due process. 
To foster agency integrity and encourage the use of the anonymous reporting systems, INM should 
also implement an internal campaign promoting a culture of openness and integrity.ccxxvii    
 
3. Increase Transparency for the Southern Border Program and CAIMFS 
 
SEGOB has published only limited information on CAIMFS, which acts as the governing body of 
the Southern Border Program. There is no public information outlining CAIMFS’s objectives and 
programs, legal backing, annual budgets, staffing numbers, or contact information. Similarly, there 
is limited public information regarding the Southern Border Program’s official documentation, 
annual budget, data reports, or contact information of its staff. This lack of public data presents a 
challenge to accountability or for measuring the program’s success.  
 
This lack of publicly available information regarding CAIMFS and the Southern Border Program 
is not in accordance with Mexico’s transparency laws. Article 74 of the Federal Law of 
Transparency and Access to Public Governmental Information (Ley Federal de Transparencia y 
Acceso a la Información Pública Gubernamental) requires a publicly available website for 
                                               
45 Currently, decisions to remove agents are often at the discretion of the INM commissioner. 
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government agencies with up-to-date information.46 Articles 70 and 79 of the General Law of 
Transparency and Access to Public Information (Ley General de Transparencia y Acceso a la 
Información Pública) require specific details be made publicly available regarding government 
programs, such as the Southern Border Program.ccxxviii 
 
SEGOB should comply with the Federal Law of Transparency by creating a public website for 
CAIMFS. The CAIMFS website should be modeled off INM’s website. INM, like CAIMFS, falls 
under the umbrella of SEGOB. The CAIMFS website should include CAIMFS’s objectives and 
programs; the agency’s legal authority to operate and how it complies with the transparency laws; 
CAIMFS’s organizational chart both internally and within SEGOB; relevant open data for 
CAIMFS; annual reports highlighting CAIMFS data and activities; annual CAIMFS budgets; press 
releases that mention CAIMFS; and contact information for questions or complaints regarding 
CAIMFS. 
 
SEGOB should make information on the Southern Border Program publicly available. As part 
of its objectives and programs, the CAIMFS website should include data and reports regarding the 
current status of the Southern Border Program. Publicly available information should include the 
program’s period of validity; design, objectives, and scope; budget amounts that were approved, 
modified and exercised; citizen complaint or grievance procedures; enforceability mechanisms; 
indicators of success; operating rules or equivalent documents; and periodic reports on evaluations 
and their results.ccxxix 
 
4. Focus on Economic Growth to Develop Mexico’s Southern Border States 
 
Mexico’s Southern Border Program focused almost exclusively on securing the border region by 
cracking down on unauthorized migration. As a result, the Southern Border Program failed to 
uphold its objectives of protecting migrants and promoting development across the region. To 
create a prosperous and safe southern border region, there should be increased humanitarian 
assistance programs that focus on enhancing well-being for both migrants and residents, as well 
as economic development in the region.  
 
Support economic development in southern Mexico. President López Obrador has promised that 
his administration will invest US$25 billion in Mexico’s southern border states, which is the least 
developed part of the country and the entry point for almost all irregular migrants.ccxxx Economic 
development and humanitarian efforts should stimulate economic growth and promote job 
creation, prioritizing youth, under-employed individuals, and migrants and refugees. While these 
development efforts are currently being led by the Ministry of Foreign Relations (Secretaría de 
                                               
46 Article 70 of the General Law of Transparency has a specific list of data that needs to be made public by government 
programs. 
 
  
 
55 
Relaciones Exteriores, SRE) and the U.S. Department of State, they should include the newly 
created Council for Investment Promotion, Employment, and Economic Growth (Consejo para el 
Fomento a la Inversión, el Empleo y el Crecimiento Económico) and the Ministry of Wellbeing 
(Secretaría de Bienestar, Bienestar).ccxxxi  
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Appendix 1: Southern Border Proposals 
 
Comprehensive Migratory Policy Proposal in the Southern Border (Propuesta de 
Política Migratoria Integral en la Frontera Sur de México) 
 
● Years: Proposed in December 2005 
● Leadership: President Vicente Fox, PAN 
● Objectives/Context: The Comprehensive Migratory Policy Proposal in the Southern 
Border sought to establish four strategic implementations: 1) facilitate migration along 
Mexico’s southern border, 2) protect the rights of migrants, 3) improve measures of 
security along the southern border, and 4) update Mexico’s immigration laws.ccxxxii 
● Responsible Organizations: The proposal was put forth by INM.ccxxxiii 
● Funding: The Mexican government.ccxxxiv 
● Execution/Implementation: The proposal was never implemented.ccxxxv  
 
Plan to Reorder the Southern Border (Plan de Reordenamiento de la Frontera Sur) 
 
● Years: Announced in 2006. 
● Leadership: President Felipe Calderón, PAN 
● Objectives/Context: The plan aimed to establish orderly migration and promote security in 
the border region. The proposed plan had five specific objectives: 1) protect human rights 
of migrants, 2) facilitate migrant documentation and help regularize their migration, 3) 
strengthen controls at ports of entry and fight corruption in migration services, 4) 
modernize infrastructure to international standards, and 5) carry out these actions to 
guarantee security, coexistence, and development in the southern border region.  
 
To achieve these objectives, Calderón detailed four steps: 1) establish Mixed Operation 
Units (Unidades Mixtas de Operación) to work with the police in Chiapas, 2) release new 
migratory forms for temporary agricultural workers and visitors, 3) review the migratory 
status of individuals in the border area, and 4) intensify punishments for corruption and 
violence toward migrants.ccxxxvi The president also stated that he would propose bilateral 
commitments to combat migrant smuggling, human trafficking, document falsification, 
and organized crime.ccxxxvii  
● Responsible Organizations: Presented by the Secretary of Public Security García 
Luna.ccxxxviii Would have been run by the Mixed Operation Units in collaboration with local 
state police forces in Chiapas.ccxxxix 
● Funding: The Mexican government.ccxl 
● Execution/Implementation: The plan was never implemented.ccxli However, a December 
2008 official document mentions the plan as a part of the 2007-2012 National Development 
Plan and details temporary visas, among other elements.ccxlii  
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● Analysis: There were conflicting reports and documents regarding the plan’s 
implementation, but it does not appear to have advanced beyond the initial 
announcement.ccxliii 
 
Appendix 2: CAIMFS Project Collaboration  
 
Figure 29 
Number of Social Programs Conducted by CAIMFS and Partnering Agencies (2014-2015) 
Partnering Agencies # Programs 
Ministry of Wellbeing (Secretaría de Bienestar, Bienestar) 11 
Rural Supply Program (Programa de Abasto Rural, Bienestar-DICONSA) / National 
Institute for Women (Instituto Nacional de las Mujeres, INMUJERES) / Social Supply 
Program for Milk (Programa de Abasto Social de Leche, LICONSA) 
3 
Ministry of Agriculture, Cattle, Rural Development, Fishing, and Nutrition (Secretaría de 
Agricultura, Ganadería, Desarrollo Rural, Pesca, y Alimentación, SAGARPA) 8 
Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources (Secretaría del Medio Ambiente y 
Recursos Naturales, SEMARNAT) 4 
SEMARNAT / Ministry of Communications and Transport (Secretaría de Comunicaciones 
y Transportes, SCT) / Bienestar 1 
Ministry of Health (Secretaría de Salud, SSA) 5 
National Commission for the Development of Indigenous Peoples (Comisión Nacional 
para el Desarrollo de los Pueblos Indígenas, CDI) 2 
Ministry of Public Education (Secretaría de Educación Pública, SEP) 2 
SEP / National Council for Education Development (Consejo Nacional de Fomento 
Educativo, CONAFE)/ National Institute for Adult Education (Instituto Nacional para la 
Educación de los Adultos, INEA) 
2 
Ministry of the Economy (Secretaría de Economía, SE) / Microfinance Fund for Rural 
Women (Fondo de Microfinanciamiento a Mujeres Rurales, FOMMUR) / National 
Institute for Social Economy (Instituto Nacional para la Economía Social, INAES) 
2 
Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare, (Secretaría del Trabajo y Previsión Social, STPS) 1 
National System for Integral Family Development (Sistema Nacional para el Desarrollo 
Integral de la Familia, DIF) 1 
Ministry of Agrarian, Land, and Urban Development, (Secretaría de Desarrollo Agrario, 
Territorial, y Urbano, SEDATU) 1 
Total 43 
Source: SEGOB report of CAIMFS’s activities for its first year 
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Appendix 3: CAIMFS Organizational Structure (2014-2019) 
 
Figure 30 includes the CAIMFS organizational chart for 2014 -2015. Figure 31 includes the 
CAIMFS organizational chart for 2019.  
 
Figure 30 
CAIMFS Organizational Structure (2014-2015) 
Level Position 
KII General Director for the Design of Public Policies and “B” Strategies 
General Director of Agreements, Integration, and Monitoring 
LII General Director for the Analysis for the Design of Public Policy and Strategies in Chiapas 
Associate General Director for Agreements 
Associate General Director for Integration and Monitoring  
MII Mid-Level Director of Monitoring and Connections A (4 positions) 
Mid-Level Director of Monitoring and Connections B (2 positions) 
Director of Agreements 
Director of Monitoring  
Director of Control 
Administrative Coordinator 
NAI Subdirector of Linkages with Federal Requests (3 positions) 
Subdirector of Linkages with State Requests  
Subdirector of Coordination with Federal Authorities (2 positions) 
Subdirector of Coordination with State Authorities (4 positions) 
Subdirector of Links A 
Subdirector of Dictation of Agreements and Agreements A  
Subdirector of Dictation of Agreements and Agreements B 
Subdirector for Agreement Applications in Chiapas and Tabasco  
Subdirector for Verification and Evaluation in Campeche and Quintana Roo 
Subdirector for Verification and Evaluation in Chiapas and Tabasco 
Subdirector for Human Resources and Budget 
Subdirector for Material Resources and General Services 
OII Head of the Monitoring Department (5 positions) 
Head of the Department for Links for the Attention (4 positions) 
Department Head Liaison (3 positions) 
Department Head Liaison for Protection 
Head of the Subscription Department in Chiapas  
Head of the Validation Office A 
Head of the Department for Control and the Guard of the Agreements 
Head of the Document Integration Department A  
Head of the Document Integration Department B  
Head of the Document Integration Department C  
Head of the Analysis Department B  
Head of the Human Resources Department  
Head of the Department for Material Resources and General Services 
P23 Secretary for the Coordinator A  
Secretary for the General Director A  
Secretary for the General Director C 
Chauffeur for the General Director A 
Chauffeur for the General Director B 
Chauffeur for the General Director C 
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Analyst for Requests with Federal Authorities B  
Analyst for Requests with Federal Authorities D  
Analyst for Requests with State Authorities B  
Analyst for Requests with State Authorities C  
Analyst for Protection with Federal Authorities A  
Analyst for Protection with State Authorities B  
Analyst for Protection with State Authorities C  
Analyst for Protection with State Authorities D  
Management Control A 
Management Control B  
P32 Chauffeur for Coordinator B 
Source: SEGOB transparency request 
 
 
Figure 31 
CAIMFS Organizational Structure 2019 
 Position 
1 Rear Admiral of the Marine Secretariat 
2 General Director for Agreements for the Coordinating Mechanism for Comprehensive Attention 
to Migration for the Southern Border 
3 Secretary for the Development of the Southern Border of Chiapas 
4 Representative for the Ministry of National Defense 
5 General Director of Personnel and the Border Commission as a Representative of the Federal 
Police 
6 General Director Attached to Social Participation for the part of the Ministry of Social 
Development 
7 Director for the Operating Center for Contingencies as a Representative of the Federal Ministry 
for Health 
Source: SEGOB transparency request 
 
Appendix 4: Additional Enforcement Infrastructure 
Information 
 
Figure 32 
CAITFsccxliv 
Location Location Details Opened Status Facility Details 
Catazajá Carretera Villahermosa - 
Escarsega Km 113 +740 S/N, 
Catazaja, Chiapas, C.P. 29980 
2015 Complete ● Mexico plans to modernize 
these facilities 
● Construction costs: 
MX$387.2 million 
● This CAITF had first federal 
prosecutor’s office, which 
opened on March 3, 2016 
Huixtla 10 Km Al Noroeste por 
Carretera Huixtla, A Villa 
Comaltitlan Km. 10 , Rancho 
Cerro Gordo, Huixtla, 
2014 Complete ● First CAITF facility in 
Mexico 
● Mexico plans to modernize 
these facilities 
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Chiapas, C.P. 30640 ● Construction costs: MX$207 
million 
Trinitaria Carretera Comitan-La 
Trinitaria Km 8+400, Colonia 
Michoacán, Trinitaria, 
Chiapas, C.P. 30160 
2015 Complete ● Facility staffed with ~100 
personnel  
● Mexico plans to modernize 
these facilities 
● Construction costs: 
MX$337.8 million 
Palenque Rancho Verde property, 
Chiapas 
N/A Planned ● Construction was expected to 
begin in 2016 
Frontera Centla Municipality, Tabasco N/A Planned ● Construction was expected to 
begin in 2017 
 
Figure 33 
INM Budget for CAITFs in MX$ (2014-2018) 
CAITF 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Huixtla $910,905.30 $1,082,851.20 $1,093,086.36 $695,873.88 $761,722.80 
La Trinitaria N/A $467,482.05 $801,397.80 $801,397.80 $801,397.80 
Playas de 
Catazajá 
N/A $779,080.96 $989,559.84 $1,599,575.56 $1,351,822.68 
Source: INM transparency request 
 
Appendix 5: Apprehensions & Deportations 
 
Figure 34 
Apprehensions per 100,000 Migrants (FY 2012-2018) 
 
Source: SEGOB, U.S. Customs and Border Protection 
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Figure 35 
Apprehensions versus Deportations in Southern Border States (2013-2018) 
 
 Source: SEGOB 
Figure 36 
Apprehensions by Nationality (2012-2018) 
 
Source: SEGOB 
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Appendix 6: Routes 
 
Figure 37 
Routes to the United States-Mexico Border 
 
Source: Train routes, major highways, and COLEF 
 
Appendix 7: Perpetrators of Crimes Against Migrants 
 
Figure 38 
Percent of Total Crimes Committed by Authorities (2013-2017) ccxlv 
Year Percent of Crimes (%) 
2013 18 
2014 20.16 
2015 41.51 
2016 17.39 
2017 25 
             Source: REDODEM 
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Figure 39 
Authorities Responsible for Crimes Against Migrants (%) (2013-2017)47 
Authority 2013ccxlvi 2014 2015ccxlvii 2016ccxlviii 2017ccxlix 
Army 4 0.71 1.73 1.30 1.92 
Federal Police 35 38.33 53.34 21.80 13.46 
INM Agents 4 . . 12.60 15.13 
Judicial (PGR) . 0.64 1.38 2.17 . 
Municipal Police 31 25.05 14.86 21.28 17.18 
Navy . 0.21 1.04 0.76 0.38 
Other . . . 11.18 15.51 
State Police 10 10.92 12.90 10.20 10.26 
Train Private Security . . . . 23.33 
Undetermined Authority 16 15.85 8.99 19.10 2.82 
Veracruz Auxiliary Police . 0.64 0.81 . . 
         Source: REDODEM 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
47 A “.” indicates that data was not provided in reports. 
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